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A "FAIR CONTRACTS" APPROVAL MECHANISM:
RECONCILING CONSUMER CONTRACTS AND
CONVENTIONAL CONTRACT LAW
Shmuel I. Becher*
Consumer contracts diverge from the traditional paradigm of contract law in
various conspicuous ways. They are pre-drafted by one party; they cannot be al-
tered or negotiated; they are executed between unfamiliar contracting parties
unequal in their market power and sophistication; they are offered frequently by
agents who act on behalf of the seller; and promisees (i.e., consumers) do not read
or understand them. Consumer contracts are thus useful in modern markets of
mass production, but they cast doubt on some fundamental notions of contract
law.
To reframe the long-lasting debate over consumer contracts, this Article develops a
superior legal regime whereby sellers can obtain certification of a form contract by
an independent third-party. Such approval may be viewed as a quality certifica-
tion, akin to a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval," for standard form
contracts.
The many impediments to the design of such a project notwithstanding, its overall
advantages are promising. The tension between the duty to read contracts and the
common practice of signing consumer contracts without reading them will be better
reconciled. The adverse consequences of asymmetric information possessed by typi-
cal sellers and consumers will be obviated. This regime will also minimize sellers'
ability to manipulate consumers' bounded rationality, increase social welfare by
reducing transaction costs, diminish socially undesirable litigation over standard-
ized contracts, make a notable step towards minimizing the alleged anomaly that
punitive damage awards create in consumer contract cases, and promote market
participants'autonomy by advancing trust between the contracting parties.
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INTRODUCTION
Standard Form Contracts ("SFCs") and the traditional paradigm
of contract law seem to have nothing in common. Unlike the con-
ventional contract envisioned by the classic contract law paradigm,
SFCs are pre-drafted by one party; they cannot be altered or nego-
tiated; they are executed between unfamiliar contracting parties
that substantially differ in their market power and sophistication;
they are offered frequently by agents who act on behalf of the
seller; and they are not read or understood by promisees (i.e., con-
sumers). While these particular characteristics make SFCs apt for
usage in modern consumer markets of mass production, they also
call some fundamental notions of contract law into question.
A fundamental assumption that accompanies modern theory of
contract law is that, by entering a contract, parties advance their
own interests. However, for a contract to maximize the utility of the
contracting parties, no substantial informational gaps should exist.
2
Unfortunately, this is not likely to be realized in the case of SFCs,
where consumers do not read SFCs prior to accepting them,
thereby creating an acute market failure known as asymmetric (or
imperfect) information.!
Moreover, consumers' cognitive biases may negatively influence
the efficiency of consumer SFCs as well, making it even harder to
achieve efficient equilibrium. Inevitably, consumers lose their abil-
ity to maximize utility via open market transactions, while social
welfare is not optimally maximized. Accordingly, some kind of in-
1. Two of the early seminal articles that address this issue are Friedrich Kessler, Con-
tracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943) and
W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARV. L. REv. 529 (1971).
2. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REv. 827, 827 (2006) (stating, merely as a starting point, that
"[t]he usual assumption in economic analysis of law is that in a competitive market without
informational asymmetries, the terms of contracts between sellers and buyers will be opti-
mal-that is, that any deviation from these terms would impose expected costs on one party
that exceed benefits to the other."); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Con-
tract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REv. 583, 585 (1990) ("[1]mperfect
consumer information causes a tendency toward inefficiency in ... consumer form con-
tracts.").
3. This potential danger has been discussed and debated at length. See, e.g., Shmuel I.
Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM.
Bus. L.J. 723 (2008); Alan Schwartz, Unconscionability and Imperfect Information: A Research
Agenda, 19 CAN. Bus. L.J. 437 (1991); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in
Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387
(1983); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Informa-
tion: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979).
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tervention aimed at protecting consumers and minimizing their
exposure to cognitive biases is generally assumed necessary.4
Commentators, courts, society and legislatures acknowledge the
problems that SFCs pose, and attempt to address them by design-
ing a variety of legal rules, tools, principles and doctrines.
Generally, such proposals and policy recommendations can be
categorized into three groups: ex post intervention by courts, ex ante
regulation by legislatures, and competition enhancement. Still,
those predominant approaches are unsatisfactory as they do not
overcome asymmetric information and consumers' behavioral bi-
ases.6 This leads to an inherent tension between the classical
paradigm of contract law on one side and consumer contracts on
the other.7
Noting the inadequacy of current approaches to SFCs takes us
only half-way. It is one thing to note that current approaches are
flawed or that a new model is needed, but quite another to suggest
how an alternative model should work." Since "[t]he boilerplate
4. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1373 (2004); Shmuel I.
Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REv. 117 (2007);
Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77
N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 435 (2002); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Con-
tracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1203 (2003); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
Comment, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1986).
5. For a brief history of the legal approach to SFCs, see Jason Scott Johnston, The Re-
turn of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative
Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REv. 857, 860-64 (2006).
6. The literature critical of current approaches to SFCs is ample. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, su-
pra note 4 (opining that competitive market forces cannot cure consumers' underestimation
of future borrowing); Becher, supra note 4 (detailing the shortcomings of market forces,
legislatures and courts); R. Ted Cruz &JeffreyJ. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of
an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1996) (arguing
that relying on a group of informed consumers to correct the market for contract terms is
misguided due to economic pitfalls); Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths about Uncon-
scionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1981) (criticizing
courts' competence to apply abstract contract law concepts such as the unconscionability
doctrine); Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-
Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REv. 837, 839 (2006) (referring to the market-based
approach and noting that "market pressure may be insufficient to deter some businesses
from overreaching."); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 4, at 441 (noting the problems
courts experience when confronting fairness issues in consumer contracts); Peter V. Letsou,
The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY L.J. 587 (1995) (questioning
legislatures' ability to solve efficiently consumer market imperfections).
7. For a recent interesting statement that questions the fundamental assumption that
SFCs are indeed contracts, see Omri Ben-Shahar, Foreword to "Boilerplate": Foundations of Mar-
ket Contracts Symposium, 104 MICH. L. REv. 821, 826 (2006) ("On a theoretical level,
boilerplate is shown to be a legal phenomenon different from contract. Is it a statute? Is it
property? Is it a product?").
8. For a succinct list of recent proposals that go beyond the traditional methods of
legislative and judicial control over SFCs, see Todd D. Rakoff, The Law and Sociology of Boiler-
plate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1235, 1243 (2006) ("In addition to the obvious possibilities of
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puzzle has lasted entirely too long,"9 the goal of this Article is to
reframe the debate over SFCs and develop a superior legal treat-
ment of such contracts.
The approach developed in this Article is based on the idea of
allowing an independent third-party to review and approve SFCs.
This proposed mechanism of prior approval aims at ensuring that
consumer contracts are fairly and efficiently drafted. Accordingly,
an approval should be viewed as a quality certification, not unlike a
"Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval," 0 for SFCs. Certification of
an SFC by an independent third-party-dubbed here the Fair Con-
tracts Approval Organization ("FCAO")-would indicate that a
seller offers a contract that meets both substantive (fairness, effi-
ciency, cognitive biases) and procedural (font, language, color,
etc.) standards as set out by the approval organization. It is also
proposed that the approving institute would have the authority to
approve any given contract as a whole, or just certain parts of it,
with some contractual clauses left unapproved ("partial approval").
Although partial approval would be legitimate, creative devices
should be utilized to encourage sellers to approve SFCs as a whole.
Approval granted to a contract would be indicated on its face by
a suitable mark. Consumers would then be able to rely on the ap-
proval, which would be interpreted as a quality signal, when
shopping for products and services. This suggested reform would
relieve consumers of the theoretical duty to read the fine print fre-
quently found in SFCs. Thus, it would economize on consumers'
time and direct their attention to crucial or problematic contracts
(or terms).
To make the system attractive for market participants, sellers
must be provided with ample incentives to use it. Accordingly, ap-
proved contracts would be immune (at least to some degree) from
certain types of legal claims and remedies. Sellers who have their
contracts approved would also stand to enhance their reputation
and market power, while reducing transaction costs and legal ex-
legislation and judicial decision, the authors [of this symposium on boilerplate] suggest in
one setting or another turning matters over to expert administrative agencies, nonprofit
trade associations, law firms that are leaders in a field, and even (although somewhat uncer-
tainly) publicity-minded watchdog groups." (footnotes omitted)).
9. Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MIcH. L. REv. 933, 950 (2006).
10. Neither the Good Housekeeping Institute nor any of its affiliates participated in
the drafting of this Article.
11. In those cases where the SFC is packaged inside a box or cannot be easily viewed
by the consumer at an early stage, the mark should be placed also on the face of the pack-
age, the vendor's website, and the like.
12. See infra Part III for a discussion of the relationship between the Fair Contracts
Approval idea and the traditional common law duty to read.
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penses. I5 Where relying on incentives would not be likely to yield
the anticipated results, specific fields of commerce or contracts are
proposed where approval should be made mandatory by law and
imposed on sellers.1
4
Before proceeding, a clarification is in order. The idea of con-
tract approval has not received wide scholarly attention in the
United States as an overall approach to consumer SFCs,I5 but it has
been employed in a limited manner in some contexts. ' Moreover,
such an approach has been implemented, albeit with limited suc-
cess, in Israel. 17 Accordingly, the Israeli path will be used to
encourage critical evaluation of the various design issues that the
establishment of the Fair Contracts Approval ("FCA") mechanism
engenders. A discussion of the Israeli experience appears below.8
I now seek to flesh out the idea of creating a FCA mechanism for
approving SFCs. Part I explores currently used mechanisms for a
priori approval as applied in some consumer markets and mer-
chandises. Parts II and III explain how the approval process, in the
context of SFCs, should work and be interpreted by consumers.
Part IV describes potential incentives that can encourage sellers
13. See infra Part IV (detailing possible incentives to use the mechanism).
14. See infra Part IV.D.
15. This is not to say that such a possibility has been wholly overlooked. See, e.g., Louis
KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 217 n.146 (2002) (mentioning the
possibility of administrative control over SFCs). Yet the only previous paper I know of that
explored in detail the idea of adopting a pre-approval mechanism of SFCs in the United
States is Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 Hous. L. REv. 975
(2005). The approach offered here differs significantly from Gillette's in many ways, and two
conspicuous ones are the following. First, Gillette focuses his analysis on e-commerce SFCs,
whereas this paper addresses both online and offline contracts. Second, Gillette concludes
his essay by stating that "[t]he relevant, and I fear still unanswered, question is whether a pre-
approval process will improve the desired match between contract terms found in the mar-
ketplace and those preferred by informed buyers." Id. at 1013 (emphasis added). This
Article explores additional perspectives to those discussed by Gillette, thus leaving no doubt
regarding this "still unanswered question." Id. After the completion of this paper, Professor
Perillo suggested a somewhat analogous idea. SeeJoseph M. Perillo, Neutral Standardizing of
Contracts, 28 PACE L. REV. 179 (2008).
16. Some states allow sellers to submit their SFCs to the state's attorney general for re-
view of some contractual aspects. See, e.g., Plain Language Contract Act, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 325G.35 (West 2004). In another context, the Insurance Services Office drafts and sells
standard policy forms, as well as submits proposed wording to state insurance commissioners
for approval. See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boiler-
plate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1113 (2006).
17. To the best of my knowledge, the Israeli pre-ruling approach is unique and has not
yet been exercised by other countries. For a discussion of the Israeli experience and the
possible causes of its failure, see Shmuel I. Becher, A Fresh Approach to the Long-lasting
Puzzle of Consumer Contracts 160-63, 249-56 (May 2005) (unpublishedJ.S.D. thesis, Yale
Law School) (on file with author).
18. See infra Part I.D. I use some insights drawn from this experience as a starting
point, while attempting to correct the mistakes that led to its failure and provide a superior
mechanism that is apt for adoption in the United States.
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and consumers to use this system, while Part V examines the con-
sequences of mistaken decisions made by the FCAO. Part VI points
to some of the future challenges that ought to be considered after
the establishment of this organization. Part VII addresses several
general objections to the approach proposed here.
I. EXISTING MECHANISMS OF PRIOR APPROVAL
& QUALITY WARRANTIES
The idea of a third-party that operates as a mechanism to ensure
quality of products or services has been exercised in several con-
texts. Studying how these systems work in other contexts can
provide relevant insights applicable to the solution that this Article
seeks to develop. This Part illustrates how some of these systems
work and what motivates their operation. 9
Seven mechanisms are discussed. The first is the Good House-
keeping Institute, which, in a sense, inspired the idea presented
here. Second and third are food certification programs: the
American Heart Association and the USDA Organic Seal. Fourth
and fifth are TRUST-e and BBBOnLine, which operate in cyber-
space as mechanisms to ensure web sites' standards of quality. Last
is a description of two legal mechanisms of a priori approval: the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and,
most importantly, the Israeli Standard Contract Tribunal.
A. The Good Housekeeping Institute
The Good Housekeeping Institute ("the Institute") declares that its
main purpose is to improve "the lives of consumers and their fami-
lies through education and product evaluation."'2 ( The Institute
functions as the consumers' evaluation laboratory of the Good
Housekeeping Magazine ("the Magazine"). In this capacity, the Insti-
tute reviews advertisements that are submitted to the Magazine.
Advertisements found acceptable by the Institute are published in
the Magazine. Most importantly for the purposes of this Article,
19. However, this Part does not provide an inclusive review of current approval
mechanisms. I focus on some important ones that provide valuable insights into the way the
present proposal should be designed.
20. SeeAbout the Good Housekeeping Research Institute, http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/
product-testing/reviews-tests/about-good-housekeeping-research-institute (last visited June 13,
2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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the approved products become eligible to earn the Good Housekeep-
ing Seal ("the Seal"). 2'
Advertisers whose products are found acceptable for advertise-
ment in the Magazine may opt to use the Seal on their advertising
and packaging, without additional charge. According to the Insti-
tute's policy, information regarding the products that are denied
approval is considered proprietary and remains confidential be-
tween the applying manufacturer and the Institute.2 As a result,
consumers cannot know which products or manufacturers were
found inappropriate for approval.
Although the Seal is commonly viewed as a quality signal or cer-
tification,2 the Good Housekeeping Consumers' Policy states that
it functions more as an extended third-party warranty.24 This illus-
trates that the Good Housekeeping mechanism is more of a
contractual term than a third-party certification program. Accord-
ing to the Good Housekeeping policy, if a product bearing the Seal
proves defective within two years of purchase, the Institute will re-
place the product or refund the purchase price. 5
Surprisingly, a random examination that I conducted shows that
many manufacturers opt not to present the certification on their
approved products. 26 A few possible reasons explain such behavior.
First are commercial considerations (i.e., the marginal cost of
21. Id.
22. Approximately 15% of the products submitted to the Institute's review and certifi-
cation are denied approval. E-mail from Susanne Williams, Director, Consumer & Reader
Services, Good Housekeeping (Feb. 19, 2004) (on file with author).
23. A research study conducted by the Institute suggests that when consumers are con-
fronted with several brands of the same product, they will select the one that bears the Seal.
See Good Housekeeping Media Kit, Seal Benefits for Marketers, http://www.ghmediakitcom/
r5/showkiosk.asp?listingid=2699437&category-id=60997 (registration required) (last visited
June 13, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The Insti-
tute claims that "[aiccording to research, 95% of consumers ... respect [the Seal] as an
icon of quality assurance, 85% are more inclined to buy the product displaying the Seal
when choosing between two brands that are similar in price and features, [and] 84% are
more likely to trust a product and its advertising if it displays the Seal." Id.
24. The Good Housekeeping Institute bears the financial responsibility to replace a
faulty product or refund the consumer for it unless the advertiser requests otherwise. E-mail
from Susanne Williams, Director, Consumer & Reader Services, Good Housekeeping (Oct.
6, 2004) (on file with author).
25. Exceptions to this general rule include automobiles, prescription drugs, and the
like. See About the Good Housekeeping Seal, http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/product-
testing/seal-holders/about-good-housekeeping-seal (last visited June 13, 2009) (on file with
the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
26. The Good Housekeeping Seal can be applied to almost all kinds of consumer mer-
chandise, including appliances, beauty, personal care and child care products, toys, food
and beverages, electronics, photography and technology. See Good Housekeeping Seal
Holders, http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/product-testing/seal-holders/ (last visited
June 13, 2009) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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adding the Seal to its products' packages or advertisements will not
be offset by the increase in sales). Second are technical problems
(e.g., size limits that prevent the manufacturer from presenting the
Seal so as to allow consumers to read what is written within the ap-
proval, as required by the Good Housekeeping Institute). Such
obstacles to sellers' participation would likely also be present in an
FCA regime and will therefore be addressed below.
B. Food Certification Programs
The first food certification program addressed here is run by the
American Heart Association. This is a national voluntary health
agency, aimed at reducing "disability and death from heart diseases
and stroke."27 In 1995, the American Heart Association established
its Food Certification Program, which seeks to provide consumers
with "a quick, easy way to identify heart-healthy foods., 2' Food
products displaying the American Heart Association Seal (known
also as the heart-check mark) are evaluated in order to ensure that
they meet the requirements set by the American Heart Association
Food Certification Program.2 9 This identification signal is supposed
to be particularly valuable since most consumers need to be as-
sisted with food selection."
Another food certification program was initiated by the United
States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"). In October 2002, the
USDA announced its decision to issue a national seal and to apply
national standards to all organic food produced in the United
States.3 The USDA Seal is aimed at guaranteeing consumers that
food items labeled "organic" are indeed organic. Since October
2002 the USDA has had in place a set of standards that most food
27. American Heart Association, Linking Policy, http://www.americanheart.org/
presenter.jhtml?identifier=6894 (last visited June 13, 2009) (on file with the University of
MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
28. American Heart Association, Make Healthy Food Choices, http://
www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=537 (last visited June 13, 2009) (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
29. These standards include criteria for heart-healthy levels of fat, saturated fat and
cholesterol. Id.
30. American Heart Association, Food Certification Program, http://
www.americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier=-2115 (last visited June 13, 2009) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (explaining that "with so many
product options-and messages on packages-it's hard to make healthy food choices with
confidence.").
31. See 7 C.F.R. § 205 (2008); see also FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE, SUMMARY: THE
USDA NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR FOOD RETAILERS AND DISTRIBU-
TION CENTERS (2002), (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://www.fmi.org/gr/USDAOrganicProgram.pdf.
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labeled "organic" must meet.32 These standards apply whether the
product is grown in the United States or imported from other
countries.
C. Web Certification Programs
One web certification program is offered by TRUSTe, which is
"an independent, unbiased trust entity" that "helps consumers and
businesses identify trustworthy online organizations."3 3 TRUSTe
mainly addresses privacy concerns. The ultimate purpose of this
initiative is to make the e-commerce environment more comfort-
able, allowing consumers to be confident with online purchases.
TRUSTe further claims to educate and protect Internet consum-
34ers.
The TRUSTe online seal-the "trustmark"-is awarded to web
sites that comply with the TRUSTe consumer resolution process
and adhere to its privacy principles. A displayed trustmark indi-
cates to online users that the certified site openly reveals, among
others, what personal identifiable information (PII) "is collected
and how it will be used; identity of the party collecting PII; whether
PII is shared with third parties; the use of any tracking technology;
whether PII is supplemented with information from other sources;
[and] choice options available to users and how to exercise
them.3 5 This information is presumed to help Internet users make
informed decisions about whether or not to release their personal
information on the web.
Another relevant mechanism is BBBOnLine, which is an arm of
the Council of Better Business Bureaus.36 Similar to TRUSTe,
BBBOnLine declares that its mission is "to promote trust and confi-
dence on the Internet."37 To attain this goal, BBBOnLine offers its
32. Farms and handling operations that sell less than $5,000 per year in organic agri-
cultural products are exempted from this program. 7 C.F.R. § 205.101 (a) (2008).
33. TRUSTe, Make Privacy Your Choice, http://www.truste.org/about/mission_
statement.php (last visited June 13, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
34. However, TRUSTe also states that it is not purely consumer oriented and that its
privacy program-which is based on an online seal-is intended to bridge the gap between
"users' concerns over privacy and Websites' needs for self-regulated information disclosure
standards." Id.
35. See TRUSTe Program Requirements, http://www.truste.org/requirements.php#
reql (last visited June 13, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
36. See Better Business Bureau, BBBOnLine (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform), available at www.bbb.org/us/bbbonline.
37. Id.
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BBBOnLine Trustmark Program.38 BBBOnLine allows web sites to
display its Seal of Approval once the site has been evaluated and
confirmed to meet its requirements.31
D. Legal Certification Mechanisms
One legal certification program is provided by The Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which declares that its pri-
mary mission is "to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation."40 Broadly speak-
ing, the SEC seeks to promote disclosure of important
information, enforce securities laws, and protect investors. As part
of its enforcement powers, the SEC launches hundreds of civil en-
forcement actions annually. The SEC consists of five appointed
commissioners and four divisions, and it has approximately 3,100
staff employees. One of the four divisions is Corporation Finance,
which "assists the Commission in executing its responsibility to
oversee corporate disclosure of important information to the in-
vesting public."4' This division reviews and pre-approves
registration documents for newly offered securities.
Another legal certification program is part of the Israeli treat-
ment of SFCs.42  The Israeli statute ("the statute") allows
pre-approval of consumer contracts by a special tribunal. Since this
system bears some resemblance to the idea developed in this Arti-
cle, some space should be filled detailing its characteristics.
Acknowledging the unequal bargaining power between typical
sellers and buyers who contract via SFCs, 3 the main purpose of the
38. The BBBOnLine Trustmark "confirms a company is an accredited business in the
BBB where they are based, has met truth in advertising guidelines, discloses information
about the business and its policies, follows basic privacy and security practices, and responds
appropriately to problems that arise." Id.
39. Id. Some authors have articulated skeptical views with regards to such programs.
See, e.g., Major R. Kenn Pippin, Consumer Privay on the Internet: It's "Surfer Beware," 47 A.F. L.
REv. 125, 160 (1999) ("[C]onsumers should not let down their guard just because there is
some sort of seal of approval .... Consumers need to know about the benefits and the limits
of seal programs and how easy it is to be misled about the scope and type of protection of-
fered by the site with a privacy seal.").
40. See Securities and Exchange Commission, How the SEC Protects Investors, Main-
tains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited June 13, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
41. Id.
42. Standard Contracts Law, 5743-1982, 37 LSI 6 (1982-83) (Isr.). This statute re-
placed the previous Israeli Standard Contract Law of 1964. Id. § 26.
43. The statute is broad in its scope since it defines "customer" as "a person to whom a
supplier proposes that an engagement between them shall be in accordance with a standard
756 [VOL. 42:4
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statute is to protect consumers from "unduly disadvantageous"
contract terms." To achieve this goal, the statute created a mecha-
nism that allows traders to get their SFCs pre-approved. The statute
establishes a "Standard Contract Tribunal" ("Tribunal" or "special
tribunal") for this purpose. Pre-approval of an SFC can be given
only by this special tribunal.4' Such an approval means certification
that the reviewed contract does not contain any unduly disadvan-
tageous terms. 6 Basically, every trader can have his SFC approved
by submitting it to the Tribunal's review.17 After the approval is
given, the trader is free to indicate the approval on the face of his
contracts.
48
As enacted, the mechanism of prior approval tries to anticipate
and avoid some potential problems. First, to simplify procedures
and to allow the Tribunal to function efficiently, the statute ex-
empts the special tribunal from most of the rules of evidence.49
Second, to encourage traders to use this mechanism, the statute
creates what seems to be a powerful incentive: an SFC that has
been approved is basically immune from annulments by the tribu-
nal and the "regular" civil courts for a period of five years.50
However, a party who considers himself aggrieved by the Tribunal's
decision can appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court." Although the
system is by and large voluntary, traders might be required to have
their contracts approved mandatorily under certain circum-
52stances.
contract, irrespective of whether he is the recipient or the giver of anything." Id. § 2. For
clarity, I retain the term "consumer" when referring to the Israeli approach.
44. Id. § 1.
45. Id. § 12.
46. Id. In addition, the Tribunal has the power to annul unduly disadvantageous terms.
The statute allows the Attorney-General, the Commissioner of Consumer Protection and
other consumer organizations to apply to the Tribunal for annulment. Id. § 16. Where a
legal dispute that involves an unfair contract term arises, consumers (as individuals) can
bring their cases before the (regular) civil courts.
47. Id. § 12. According to this section, sellers can even have contracts approved that
are already in use in commerce.
48. The previous law from 1964 required sellers to do so. Standard Contracts Law, 5724-
1964, § 13, 18 LSI 51, 52 (1963-64) (Isr.). This requirement was thought to be unnecessary
and accordingly is not in the current statute. Surprisingly, most sellers who opted to have
their contracts approved did not include that approval on the contract's face.
49. See supra note 42, § 9.
50. Id. § 14. The special Tribunal has the authority to annul a term of an approved
contract only "if it finds that special reasonsjustify the annulment." Id. § 14(c).
51. Thus, the Attorney-General, as well as consumer organizations, can appeal to the
Supreme Court against the Tribunal's decision to grant an approval. Id. § 10.
52. For a further discussion, see VARDA LuSTHAUS & TANA SPANIC, STANDARD CON-
TRACTS §§ 160-161 (1994) (in Hebrew). On the option of imposing mandatory approval,
see infra Part IV.D.
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The success of the Israeli Tribunal is highly disputed. The activ-
ity of the special tribunal is considerably limited, and its creation
did not engender the expected effect. 53 Since it is difficult to learn
how to succeed only by studying other legal systems, especially
where they seem not to thrive, some clear thinking about the FCA
mechanism design is required. However, essential factors and as-
pects of the Israeli experience occasionally will serve as an
important starting point in the discussion that follows.
In sum, the idea of an independent third-party that examines
products' characteristics and assures the general pool of consum-
ers that a product meets specific standards of quality is applied in
some fields of commerce. The first three sections surveyed a few
mechanisms of prior approval, mainly in the context of food and
cyberspace. It is not a coincidence that one can find such mecha-
nisms in these two fields, for there consumers are extremely hard
pressed to test products' quality. Most consumers do not have the
information, knowledge, time or expertise required to check if a
food product is organic or how good it is for their health. Similarly,
most Internet surfers cannot distinguish between safe and unsafe
web sites, even after a long period of usage. Basically, the same is
true in the case of SFCs, where consumers as a class suffer from
asymmetric information.
II. MAKING THE SYSTEM WORK: ADDRESSING PRACTICAL ASPECTS
The FCA idea assumes that an independent body will be author-
ized to grant approval to SFCs. Sellers who seek such approval will
have to adhere to relatively clear criteria and unambiguous stan-
dards formulated by the FCAO. Contract approval should thus be
viewed by consumers as a "best practice" certification.
Accordingly, three substantial issues are discussed in this Part.
The first, discussed in Part II.A, explains why traders should be al-
lowed to gain partial approval of their contracts instead of being
permitted to gain only approval of contracts in their entirety or
nothing at all. The second substantial inquiry, advanced in Part
II.B, focuses on the relationship between the FCA mechanism and
the idea of pre-approved default terms. The third issue, detailed in
Part II.C, explains why approval should be based on a binary sys-
53. See, e.g., Galia Messika, The Standard Contracts Tribunal in Reality-Much Ado about
Nothing, 32 MISHPATIM 95 (2001) (in Hebrew). Masika provides numerical data that support
this argument. Apps. A, B, and C, at 127-29.
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tem, rather than graded on a scale indicating the degree of the con-
tract's fairness.
A. Allowing Partial Approval
Allowing partial approval has a few noticeable advantages. First,
it is only reasonable to predict that in some instances the approv-
ing body will not be able (let alone in a cost-effective way) to reach
an ex ante decision regarding some of the terms being reviewed for
approval. In these cases, the FCAO might prefer approving only
the parts that are not deemed problematic. 4 Moreover, consumers
are heterogeneous, and what might seem to be efficient and fair
for some types of consumers might not be so for others. Thus, dif-
ferent consumers might have varying preferences as to the scope of
insurance or warranty they value and thus are willing to purchase.
Additionally, different terms entail different risks which might be
balanced by other contractual terms. For example, think of a regu-
lar computer purchase. Both a one-year warranty and a three-year
warranty (for the same computer) might be plausible and either
could be efficient or fair.55 Thus, it might be a very challenging task
to decide what exact term should be considered a "best practice.5 6
This inherent limit is a crucial one, and it should be seriously taken
into consideration. 7
From a sellers' standpoint, the significance of strong incentives
to use the proposed FCA mechanism cannot be overemphasized. If
sellers will not use the mechanism in light of its strictness, which
could be, in part, a result of an "all-or-nothing" regime, the
54. Common examples of contractual terms which are hard (or impossible) to ap-
prove ex ante are price, return policy, or guarantees, which vary over time and turn on cost
fluctuations and other market dynamics.
55. This is so, since where sellers offer an extended warranty they are also likely to
demand an additional price premium. Of course, the fairness of an extended warranty de-
pends on the premium the seller requires. For an argument that extended warranties
exploit consumers' bounded rationality and are thus problematic, see Colin Camerer et al.,
Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetic Paternalism," 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1251-52 (2003).
56. Proponents of the "all-or-nothing" regime could somewhat mitigate the problem of
institutional inability by allowing denied sellers to indicate on their contracts that the con-
tract was not approved because of the approving body's own inability or capacity limits. This
would allow sellers to maintain, at least in part, the ability to assure consumers that the con-
tract was denied approval for reasons other than problematic drafting methods.
57. Leaving the non-approved terms to be considered by consumers, however, is not a
simple solution either. It is true that, at times, consumers are better situated to evaluate a
contract term in light of their specific interests. Yet, in many other instances, it is plausible to
presume that if specific contract terms are found hard to evaluate by the approving body,
consumers will also encounter hurdles in doing so.
SUMMER 2009]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
enterprise is much less probable to succeed. The flexible frame-
work-where sellers can apply for partial approval-is much more
likely to be accepted by sellers. Such a regime would make it easier
for sellers to receive an approval, while also allowing more drafting
options.
The situation might be different once we consider consumers'
perspectives. For consumers, approving contracts on an "all-or-
nothing" basis would certainly simplify the system. Under this
alternative regime, since the contract would be examined as a
whole, consumers would not have to survey contracts and read
non-approved parts. Strong opponents of the common law duty to
read contracts, 58 those who believe that cognitive biases prevent
consumers from reading and fully understanding standardized
terms, and scholars who doubt whether consumers have sufficient
incentives to read SFCs are likely to be more supportive of the "all-
or-nothing" alternative.59
However, consumers might nonetheless prefer a partial regime
since it will provide them with a wider variety of contracts to
choose from. Under the "all-or-nothing" regime, this argument
contends, sellers will end up using the same set of terms which will
be regarded as the minimum that satisfies the standards set out by
the FCAO. Moreover, sellers who do not approve their contracts
might end up with another incentive to engage in a race-to-the-
bottom, knowing that relatively "balanced" terms are less likely
than before to be appreciated by consumers (as long as such terms
are not approved). I will return to this issue below. °
Sellers' ability to manipulate the system is another issue that is
important to mention. The "all-or-nothing" approach will encour-
age sellers not to try and camouflage or add non-approved
contractual terms that would undermine the pre-approved ones.
One dominant problem with partial approval, for example, is the
substitution of remedy: crafty sellers might try to use the mecha-
nism in order to approve most of the contract's provisions, but not
a provision that substitutes the remedy to which consumers are
entitled.6'
The same sort of problem can be a result of a contractual term
which assures unrestricted unilateral discretion in changing the
58. For further discussion, see infra Part III.
59. For those who believe that consumers are capable of reading SFCs, there still re-
mains the inquiry of balancing between the advantages of a flexible regime and the main
disadvantage of inducing many consumers to spend time reading standardized provisions.
60. See infra Part VII.C.
61. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 9, at 950 ("A great warranty enforceable only after arbi-
tration in Nepal is not worth much.").
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contract's substance. One case that illustrates this problem is
Rossman v. Fleet Bank (RI.) National Ass'n.62 In this case, Fleet issued
a credit card with "no annual fee." About six months later, Fleet
invoked a contractual provision which provided it with unilateral
power to change the contract in order to impose on Rossman a $35
annual fee.63 The Third Circuit ruled that Fleet must not charge
any annual fee for a period of one year. Substitution of remedy and
unilateral discretion to change an SFC are two examples of con-
tractual terms that can turn the fairness of the contract on its head.
A simple and practical way that would allow sellers to gain partial
approval would be to put all terms which are not approved by the
FCAO and are not considered as "best practices" in a special frame
or box. At the same time, all the other provisions, which are ap-
proved as "best practices," would be put outside of this frame.
Visual measures should be tailored to minimize consumers' diffi-
culties in distinguishing between the different parts (approved vs.
unapproved) of the contract. This might be done, for example, by
locating non-approved terms at the front of the contract or by us-
ing noticeable visual characteristics (such as color6 and size of font
for both the frame and the terms themselves). At the same time,
approved provisions can be appended to the unapproved ones.65
Consumers would thus be advised to focus their attention on the
non-approved contractual terms that are included in this frame or
box.66
Moreover, like each of the mechanisms discussed above,67 the
FCA mechanism would issue its own Seal as a way of signaling con-
tracts' quality to consumers. A partial regime would allow (nearly)
all interested sellers, including those that use mostly unfair terms
in their forms, to have the FCA Seal on their contracts. This is so,
62. 280 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002).
63. For an explanation of the relationship between terms that guarantee unilateral
change and behavioral patterns that allow sellers to manipulate consumers, see Becher,
supra note 4. See also supra Part II.E.2.
64. Thus, for instance, we might use the color red to print non-approved parts, know-
ing that red attracts people's attention and enhances excitement and alertness.
65. This regime, where sellers are not obliged to approve their contracts as a whole,
will be titled here a "partial approval regime." It is important to note, however, that the ap-
proving body would be required to review the contract in its entirety even when granting
merely partial approval, thus moderating the problem of institutional mistakes. For an
analysis of mistaken approvals, see infra Part V.
66. This would be natural as people tend to think "inside the box." See also Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1610(e), 1637(c) (2000) (requiring credit card issuers to use the
"Schumer box" to reveal information). For additional information regarding the "Schumer
box," see Welcome to SchumerBox.com, http://www.schumerbox.com/ (last visited June
13, 2009) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
67. See supra Part I.
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since even in the harshest contracts one can insert a fair provision.
Unfortunately, much of the FCA Seal's attractiveness and meaning
would be diminished if sellers could present an approval which
would be granted only to minor or unimportant parts of their con-
tracts. As a consequence, consumers would be bothered again with
the duty to read SFCs. Alternatively, consumers might end up ig-
noring the approval-which under the partial regime will have
little force as a signal-thus undermining its purpose and strength.
However, these obstacles, while significant, can be addressed.
First and foremost, it is important to recall that the approving body
would be required to review the contract as a whole even when
granting merely a partial approval.68 By doing so, we can ensure
that the FCAO will refrain from granting partial approval when the
non-approved part makes the contract as a whole fundamentally
unfair. In other words, this requirement entails categorization of
reviewed contractual terms into three main groups. The first group
of terms includes those that are approved as "best practices." The
second constitutes those provisions that are not approved but have
no relation to the approved parts and are thus left for consumers'
evaluation. The last group includes those harsh and exceptional
terms that not only are not "best practices," but may furthermore
undermine the fairness of the contract as a whole. If the FCAO
finds a term that belongs to this last group, it should refrain from
giving any kind of contractual approval.
Another way to mitigate this concern would be devising two
kinds of approval seals. One kind would be given to partial ap-
proval, whereas another, distinct in its physical characteristics and
appearance, would be designed for contracts that are approved as
a whole. Despite making the system somewhat more complicated,
if this idea were implemented wisely it could ensure that buyers
would not be misled by partial approval, nor would they end up
reading unnecessary contract terms. Moreover, the FCAO could
establish minimum standards for approval, thus excluding ap-
proval of merely marginal or unimportant terms.
Last, the disadvantages associated with a partial regime could be
further alleviated by differentiating between partial approval and
full approval in other ways. One option concerns the approval fee
traders might be required to pay when submitting their contracts
for review.69 Charging a lower premium for "full approval" may en-
courage sellers to seek approval for the entire contract. An
additional possible method would be to adopt a partial regime
68. See supra note 65.
69. For a more detailed treatment of the issue of approval fees, see infra Part VI.C.
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where approved terms should meet substantive standards, whereas
the non-approved terms will have to meet some procedural re-
quirements (such as font, color, size, etc.).
B. Validation of Approved Clauses and Incorporation of Default Terms
One can think of a whole range of measures aimed at protecting
consumers from fine print and unfair SFCs. For example, sellers
might be required to ask consumers to rewrite a contractual term
in order to validate it or to sign their names or initials beside spe-
cific contract terms. It is assumed that by rewriting terms or signing
next to particular provisions there is a higher likelihood that the
adhering party will become acquainted with their content. The
FCAO might condition approval on buyers' compliance with such
requirements.
Yet, such options are prone to be inefficient. They substantially
increase transaction costs and force people to waste time on provi-
sions they frequently cannot understand or fully appreciate.
Nevertheless, using these two options in a selective manner (i.e., in
exceptional circumstances and contracts) might be acceptable as a
supplemental tool which the FCAO can advance to assure consum-
ers' consent to some types of provisions.70 Thus, these methods can




Another interesting issue is incorporation of default terms. Con-
tracts cannot specify all future contingences. Contracting parties
cannot anticipate, much less negotiate for, all theoretical future
states of the world. The term "incompleteness contracting" refers
to contracts in which the obligations of the contracting parties are
not fully detailed. 72 Default rules respond to this incompleteness by
proposing a way to fill these gaps.7' Such rules govern the incom-
plete contract unless the parties contract around them.
70. For an argument that legal rules that force people out of their routine might be
justified as a cautionary function, see Baird, supra note 9, at 944.
71. Recall for a moment the discussion above with respect to the possibility that differ-
ent warranty terms might be efficient, depending on one's preferences. The FCAO could
condition approval of the relevant contract on such terms. Re-writing or signing next to a
term might alert consumers and thus encourage careful consideration prior to acceptance.
72. In contrast, a contract will be considered complete, with respect to obligations, if
the parties' obligations are fully specified for all future states. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gert-
ner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L. J. 729,
730 (1992).
73. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
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Indeed, there might be some fields of commerce, relatively ho-
mogenous, where the FCAO itself will be able to draft and propose
a complete SFC. Such a case might turn the process of standard
form contracting on its head, with consumers being the ones that
offer sellers an SFC.4 Alternatively, or where drafting a whole con-
tract would not be feasible or efficient, the FCAO could propose
specific contract clauses, such as those that deal with arbitration,
warranty, remedies, forum selection, liability, and the like.75 Thus,
we can think of a regime where a general provision would incorpo-
rate, by reference, pre-approved "best practices" terms to all
approved contracts in a given field of commerce or type of transac-
tion. This would provide a stronger incentive for consumers to
prefer approved contracts.
76
There are other immediate consequences of such incorporation.
First, it would provide sellers with an incentive to clearly specify
departures from the pre-approved "best practice" default terms.
Arguably, this will result in disclosure of important information to
the non-drafting party. Second, it will make it more expensive for
sellers to deviate from desired rules. Third, these default rules
might further project normative desired practices. Moreover, be-
havioral law and economics analysis suggests that people tend to
maintain what they conceive to be the status quo. Thus, these de-
fault rules tend to be "sticky."77 All in all, incorporation of default
terms prepared by the FCAO will increase the likelihood that the
normatively desired rule will be chosen. Additionally, an automatic
adoption of default rules will shorten SFCs.5
74. For an assertion that consumers might be able to present to sellers pre-drafted
contracts that were prepared by legislative bodies, see Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as
an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 679, 720-21.
75. For an argument that the credit card industry requires the adoption of a manda-
tory pre-approved set of contract terms, see Ronald J. Mann, "Contracting" for Credit, 104
MICH. L. REV. 899 (2006).
76. For a detailed discussion regarding consumers' incentives to shop for approved
contracts, see infra Part IV.C.
77. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 608 (1998).
78. Another possible way to shorten SFCs would be to allow (or require) terms which
comply with substantive reasonableness standards to not be included in the contract's four
corners. These pre-approved default terms would be available for consumers' review via
other informational sources, such as a website or a free brochure. This, in turn, would sim-
plify SFCs and economize on consumers' time while drawing their attention to the more
problematic contractual parts (or contracts). At the same time, by adopting default rules
and excluding other approved terms from print, sellers would be able to minimize drafting
efforts and expenses. The costs that can be reduced this way include print and paper costs,
negotiation and interaction between sellers and buyers over SFC provisions, legal drafting
expenses, salesmen training, and the like.
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To summarize, there are a variety of ways to set the requirements
for validation of contractual approval. On one polarity, approval
can be conditioned on active actions such as re-writing contract
terms or signing next to specific terms. On the other polarity, ap-
proved default terms set by the FCAO can be incorporated by
reference, without detailing the terms themselves within the four
corners of the contract. In between these two polarities, the FCAO
can allow, or at times even require, that approved terms appear in
the contract's four corners.
C. Advancing Binary Approval
The next thorny issue to examine is how SFCs should be ap-
proved. One possibility is to approve contracts using a binary
system, where contracts are either approved or not. A second pos-
sibility is to approve contracts on a scale basis. This can be done,
for example, by grading contracts using a numerical range (from 1
to 5, for instance).
Let us assume Y is an average consumer interested in purchasing
a TV for her house. Y, not unlike most consumers, can easily dis-
tinguish between a 19" TV and a 32" one. She can also quite easily
distinguish between different TV brands. Similarly, Y is familiar
with the different payment arrangements proposed by the retail
stores (at least in general terms) and she is likely, in most cases, to
be able to roughly categorize the TV she is examining as "expen-
sive," "average," or "cheap." If contracts become salient for
consumers, why shouldn't Y be able to include the quality of the
contract offered by the seller as a prominent merchandise feature?
Under this scenario, Y is likely to get back home and tell her
spouse: "I found a great 32" flat panel Sony TV, contract grade 4, for
just $1099 to be paid in 5 installments with no interest. What a bar-
gain!"
A close examination reveals some merit to this scenario. The
phrase "contract grade 4" represents contractual aspects of the
transaction at stake, including those that the average consumer
lacks the ability, time or willingness to evaluate properly. Thus, a
grading system would release consumers from evaluating compli-
cated contractual aspects while giving them a good (though
rough) sense as to the contract's quality. Moreover, grading SFCs
also seems to fit neatly within the American culture, which
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invents-and increasingly employs-ranking and grading systems
in numerous contexts.79
The key question, aside from making SFCs a salient feature for
consumers, is whether we could reach a consistent way to evaluate
and grade such contracts."' Grading contracts is a challenging task
for a few good reasons. First, different fields of commerce require
different "best practices." What might be considered as "good prac-
tice" in one field may not be regarded so in another. For example,
a provision that forbids the buyer from returning an item after
opening its wrapping or container might be a reasonable one when
dealing with a cereal box. Yet the same provision strikes us as un-
fair in the industry of "rolling contracts," where buyers do not have
the opportunity to examine the product prior to purchase. Addi-
tionally, as already noted, contractual clauses may be good for
some kinds of consumers but not for others. For instance, some
consumers prefer wide-scope warranties, while others legitimately
prefer a narrow coverage.
Another demanding mission is to attribute weight to the differ-
ent provisions that are included in a contract and to come up with
a total evaluation that takes into account the different weights and
grades given to the different terms. Because the approved part is to
be graded as a whole, and since it is likely that different provisions
will represent different level of fairness, determining the formula
79. Cf Russell Korobkin, Ranking Journals: Some Thoughts on Theory and Methodology, 26
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 851, 851 (1999) ("Americans love rankings-of practically anything.").
For a few examples, see U.S. News Rankings, http://www.usnews.com/sections/rankings
(last visited June 13, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(ranking, among others, colleges, graduate schools, hospitals, health plans, cars and trucks);
Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/index.aspx (last visited
June 13, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (ranking law
journals); The ZAGAT Guide, http://www.zagat.com/ (last visited June 13, 2009) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (grading restaurants, ho-
tels, nightclubs, etc.); New Chart: Best Ranking Movies by Weekend Rank, http://
www.boxofficemojo.com/siteinfo/?id=1368&p=.htm (last visited June 13, 2009) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (best-ranking movies); Books and List-
ings Ranking Influential People, http://www.adherents.com/people/100jists.html (last
visited June 13, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(books and lists ranking people in various categories); Social Science Research Network
Home Page, http://www.ssrn.com/ (last visitedJune 13, 2009) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (ranking academic authors, papers and institutions);
Forbes Lists, World's Richest People, and More, http://www.forbes.com/lists/ (last visited
June 13, 2009) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (ranking
powerful and best-paid movie stars, musicians and athletes, best brokerage analysts on Wall
Street, big and small companies and much more).
80. Another key question-though much more preliminary-is how important it is to
grade contracts on a scale, and whether the benefit that can be gained by this regime out-
weighs the costs associated with it. For the purposes of the analysis presented here, I assume
that it is important enough to consider whether it can be undertaken efficiently.
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to be used seems perplexing. Since we deal with a question of de-
gree-rather than a binary evaluation-the process of numerically
grading becomes a very complicated one.81
At least one more factor should be taken into consideration in
this respect. A scale-based evaluation can arguably be done by con-
sumer agencies and consumer reports, rather than expecting the
approving body to undertake this assignment. This is to argue, in
other words, that the FCAO should merely provide consumers with
a basic and simple signal of quality. The degree of this quality, ac-
cording to this argument, can be determined by consumer-
oriented organizations or watchdog groups..
However, at this point, it should be noted that it is yet unclear
whether consumer-oriented organizations are willing and compe-
tent to undertake this mission. Moreover, it seems that the
institution granted the authority to approve contracts can more
successfully and efficiently grade them. If two distinct institutions
conduct a thorough investigation with respect to the same contract
(i.e., one for approval purposes and the other for grading pur-
poses) the process will become costlier and thus less efficient.
What's more, if we perceive the approving institution to be a cen-
tral player in the consumer protection arena, giving it the
discretion and responsibility to grade contracts will upgrade its
function and the protection offered to consumers.
In sum, I believe that, in order to afford a smooth beginning,
the FCAO should be vested with the authority to approve contracts
on a binary basis, while refraining from grading contracts on a
scale. Hopefully, this will simplify the mechanism and make its us-
age easier. Nevertheless, this conclusion should be held tentatively
and policy makers should revisit it once the mechanism has been
established and experience has been gained.
III. CONTRACT APPROVAL AND THE COMMON LAW "DUTY TO READ"
Traditionally, the contractual relationship between consumers
and sellers is not disturbed by third parties. Rather, it is mainly
formed by the parties' behavior, agreements, and actions. The
proposed mechanism of prior approval departs from this basic un-
derstanding and brings into the drama a new third-party actor.
This third force will inevitably change the set of legal entitlements
81. For an interesting attempt to examine the content of software license contracts,
see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What's in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of
Software License Agreements, 4J. Emp. LEG. STUD. 677 (2007).
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and duties that contracting parties face. One of the most crucial
issues in this respect is how contractual approval will alter the ap-
plication of the common law duty to read contracts.
8 2
The FCA Seal can be viewed as a signal for consumers not to
read approved contracts. Accordingly, the duty to read should not
be applied to consumers who enter approved contracts. The theo-
retical explanation behind this idea is that there is a third-party-
the FCAO-that reads the approved contract on behalf of
consumers. In fact, consumers can be viewed as delegating their
duty to read to the FCAO.
This approach has a few strong advantages. First, it allows con-
sumers to focus on the parts of the contract (or contracts) that are
not approved. This alternative becomes even more appealing once
we consider the problems associated with the phenomenon of in-
formation overload and human limited capacity and scarce
resources. 3 Consumers are more likely to be influenced by sellers'
advertisements, oral representations, and reputation while being
less able to read and understand SFCs.s4 Since approval would
eliminate the duty to read, consumers would not be required to
engage in evaluating SFCs, a task they are not competent to per-
form. This, in turn, would encourage consumers to shop for
approved contracts. 85 Moreover, this alternative tracks the common
usage of other seals of approval. Allowing consumers to rely on the
FCA Seal as a signal of quality follows this established and intuitive
tendency.
Another aspect that can shed more light on this issue is the way
one regards the law (or more specifically-contract law) in a
broader sense: whether it should follow life or rather modify it.
8 6
82. For a further discussion of the common law duty to read and its relation and im-
pact on the law of SFCs, see, for example, John D. Calamari, Duty to Read--A Changing
Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341 (1974); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract
Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMi L. REv. 1263 (1993).
83. For a discussion about the problems that information overload generates in the
context of consumer SFCs, see, for example, Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdis-
closure and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63
VA. L. REv. 841 (1977); Korobkin, supra note 4; Eisenberg, supra note 4. For a counter-
argument that information overload is not a serious threat for consumers, see David M.
Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986).
84. Boardman has recently argued that a consumer "could have no fair duty to under-
stand, and so has no duty to read." Boardman, supra note 16, at 1105. The author opines
that drafters of insurance SFCs may employ ambiguous contractual terms even after they
have been interpreted against the draftsmen since those terms that were interpreted by
courts have a fixed meaning and thus are valued for their clarity. Id.
85. See infra Part IV.C (discussing consumers' incentives to use the FCA mechanism).
86. This idea is related to the much more general question of the potential and ability
of the law to reform people's behavior and influence "real world" practices and attitudes.
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Whereas there is little doubt that law is one of the social forces that
can and indeed does influence people's conception and behavior,
the power, effectiveness, and value of this function are strongly
disputed s7 If one accepts the assertion that law should be humble
with respect to changing customary human habits, then one might
follow recognized practices (such as consumers' tendency not to
read SFCs) unless some compelling justifications have been estab-
lished.
In essence, a workable and effective regime would be to view the
FCA mechanism as a promise of contractual content quality, thus
exempting consumers from reading approved contracts. Viewing
approval as an exemption from reading better matches the ration-
ale behind the usage of other seals of approval. It goes with, rather
than against, consumers' well-established tendency not to read
SFCs and it does not attribute too much rationality to consumers as
a class. It further provides a response to people's need to minimize
transaction costs, it does not confront consumers with cognitive
tasks they are not apt to carry out efficiently, and it creates a
stronger incentive for consumers to shop for and prefer approved
contracts.8 8
The example frequently used as a starting point for many discussions is racial inequality. See,
e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity Caricature: A Local Legal History Lesson in the Salience
of Intraracial Conflict, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (2003). It should be emphasized, however, that
our context is much narrower and less ambitious, since the behavior which is sought to be
influenced in our case is more commercial and less public in nature. Nevertheless, I believe
that the argument of the derivative nature and secondary influence of the law is valid here
as well as in the much broader contexts.
87. Critical legal studies ("CLS"), for example, is understood to be one of the streams
in legal scholarship that strongly doubts social change through law. See, e.g., Jane E. Larson,
Introduction: Third Wave--Can Feminists Use the Law to Effect Social Change in the 1990s ?, 87 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1252, 1253 (1993) ("In the hostile political climate of the past decade, visionary
efforts to transform society through law began to appear increasingly-and perhaps fool-
ishly-naive."); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM.J. INT'L
L. 470, 485-86 (1995) (reviewing LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (Anthony Carty ed., 1992) and
LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala eds., 1993) and
suggesting that the center of gravity in each society rests not in its law and that the law is not
likely to generate from within itself a solution to social problems); Jason E. Whitehead, From
Criticism to Critique: Preserving the Radical Potential of Critical Legal Studies Through a Reexamina-
tion of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 701, 718 (1999) (associating CLS
with a "radical skepticism toward all theories that attempt to understand and change society
through law.").
88. However, the system should be flexible enough to allow the FCAO to deviate from
this general rule when needed by employing some measures to assure consumers' attention
to more sensitive terms. Some of the measures to promote this idea have been discussed in
Part II.B. and they include, inter alia, re-writing provisions, signing initials, and using con-
spicuous print and font.
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IV. INCENTIVES FOR USING THE SYSTEM
Since the proposed FCA system would operate on a voluntary
basis, it will not succeed unless the market's actors-both sellers
and consumers-have sufficient incentives to use it. Economists
refer to these incentives as participation constraints. This Part deals
with potential incentives and the way policymakers can make the
FCA mechanism more attractive.
A. Sellers'Perspective
A voluntary system relies on sellers' willingness to use it. If sellers
are able to enlarge their share of contractual benefits at the ex-
pense of consumers through the use of self-serving terms, then we
should expect socially-inefficient terms to be employed. In other
words, if the social loss generated by unfair and inefficient contract
terms is not borne by sellers, sellers have an incentive to offer bi-
ased, self-serving terms in their contracts rather than to have them
approved. Furthermore, even where the pre-drafted terms are fair
and efficient, sellers might nevertheless prefer to refrain from us-
ing this system due to the costs associated with the necessary
interaction with the proposed institution. These "interaction costs"
can include, for example, legal assistance, time investment, the
contract approval fee (if and where applicable),89 print costs and
the like.
Hence, sellers might refrain from obtaining approval of their
contracts for two main reasons. First, they might prefer to obtain
the ability to draft one-sided terms. Second, they might draft fair
and efficient contract terms but be reluctant to approve them be-
cause of the costs that approval entails. Can the proposed system
overcome these participation constraints?
Assume a contractual term, X, is being used by a firm.90 Further
assume that the firm rationally evaluates the expected utility of this
term and that it considers gaining contract approval. One of the
underlying ideas of the FCA mechanism is that, by obtaining ap-
proval for their SFCs, sellers can ensure that their contracts are
immune, at least to some degree, against legal claims.9' Thus, ap-
89. See infra Part VI.C.
90. For simplifying purposes the example here involves an approval of a specific term;
nonetheless, the analysis would be much the same for approving a whole contract.
91. For a listing of some of these potential claims and a discussion of the rationale of
immunizing approved contracts from such claims, see infra Part IV.B.2.
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proval should be viewed as another precaution that sellers can take
for assuring validation and adherence to contractual terms.92
The assertion that by gaining an approval a seller will minimize
his liability towards aggrieved consumers should be examined care-
fully. First, if term X is unfair, it cannot be approved. This
observation makes it clear that term X will have to be changed (or
be a fair term from the very beginning) in order to be approved.
By the same token, once a term has been changed to a "best prac-
tice" term (or was a "best practice" beforehand), one might ask
why a seller should seek approval for such a term. Seemingly, sell-
ers would not face any liability to aggrieved consumers when using
"best practice" terms, even if those terms are not approved by the
FCAO. In short, sellers who wish to use unjust terms cannot ap-
prove them, whereas sellers who wish to use "best practice"
provisions do not need to have them approved in order to dimin-
ish their liability. Contract immunization, according to this logic,
would seem to be an invalid justification for contract approval.
Though interesting, this argument is misleading. First, sellers
might wish to gain approval for fair and efficient terms in order to
refrain from incurring expenses responding to frivolous suits. Sec-
ond, by obtaining approval for their contracts, sellers can minimize
the prospects of suffering losses that are due to mistaken judicial
decisions.9 Third, the assumption that sellers have all relevant in-
formation regarding term X, including, inter alia, whether the
term is to be considered as "best practice" or not, is far from being
trivial. Hence, if full information and clear categorization of term
X as a "best practice" term is not at hand, sellers might use the cer-
tification mechanism as a method to eliminate such an ex ante
uncertainty.
Besides serving as a valuable precaution that sellers can take,
sellers can also gain reputation by obtaining contract approval.94
92. With respect to precautions taken by sellers, it is important to note that whereas
individuals are assumed to be risk-averse, firms are assumed to be risk-neutral. See, e.g., Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541,
550 n.16 (2003) (explaining the two facts that support this proposition).
93. One might argue that, since a term's approval could be reviewed by courts, sellers
would actually not be able to immunize their contracts against judicial mistakes. See infra
Part V.C. In other words, adjudication errors would still be possible when courts review the
approval made by the FCAO. Nevertheless, the incidence of such mistakes can be expected
to decrease dramatically once a contract has been approved. First, the FCAO may well estab-
lish some level of reputation that courts should respect. Second, fewer cases will be brought
before the court in the first place, since litigants (and their lawyers) would be aware of the
deference to approval decisions.
94. The relation and correlation between fine print and sellers' reputation is an excit-
ing topic to explore from various perspectives. For a few recent examples, see Baird, supra
note 9, at 938; Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 2; Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract
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Put simply, approved contracts will be viewed by consumers as a
positive quality signal. This will increase the seller's reputation and,
as a result, enhance his market power. More generally, therefore,
sellers are likely to respond to the FCA regime in two typical ways.
Swindling sellers will oppose this mechanism since it undermines
their ability to exploit consumers. By the same token, legitimate
sellers will benefit since it provides them with another vital tool to
distinguish themselves from unscrupulous ones.' Both conse-
quences, of course, are normatively desirable.
Using contractual approval as a means to enhance reputation
has an additional potential advantage: it might advance the chal-
lenging task of making SFCs terms a salient attribute from
consumers' perspective. By using the FCA Seal as a quality signal of
"fairness" or "best practice," sellers might be more likely to engage
in a "race-to-the-top," mainly by pointing out a contract's approval
to potential consumers. The FCA system, in other words, can en-
courage sellers to bring the fact of approval to consumers'
attention by making the evaluation of contracts simple and avail-
able.
The possibility of gaining reputation through contractual ap-
proval is also related to sellers' ability to reduce transaction costs
once they approve their contracts. Sellers who opt for approval
could reduce transaction costs since less time is likely to be spent
answering consumers' questions with regards to contractual aspects
and addressing concerns that might arise from SFCs. In addition,
this decreased need to assure consumers they are entering a good
contract might also reduce the need to train salesmen to address
contractual and legal issues. Similarly, it has the potential to mini-
mize the chances that a salesman's oral representations will cause
misunderstandings.
Closely related, where sellers use pre-approved SFCs they might
also minimize drafting expenses. Sellers who wish to approve their
contracts may choose from among those default terms that are pre-
approved as best-practice terms by the FCAO. As noted,96 sellers
could rely on pre-approved default terms, incorporate them into
Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELE-
comm. & TECH. L. REV. 303 (2008).
95. That contract law should form legal rules that allow honest and reliable sellers to
distinguish themselves from unscrupulous competitors is a well recognized idea that assisted
courts at least as early as the 19th century. See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., (1893) 1
Q.B. 256 (U.K.) (holding a seller liable to his pre-contractual presentation while noting that
not doing so will undercut honest sellers' ability to distinguish themselves); see also Baird,
supra note 9, at 947-48.
96. See supra Part II. B.
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their contracts using a general reference, or use them as a starting
point in their drafting process. By adopting pre-approved default
rules and simplifying SFCs, sellers may substantially reduce legal
fees and print expenses.
B. Providing Stronger Incentives for Sellers: Influencing the Main Factors
The previous discussion made explicit the different considera-
tions sellers might have regarding contractual approval. Having
this background in mind, it should be simple to understand how
we can influence some of the factors that dominate sellers' deci-
sions. I now address these factors.
1. Self-serving Terms & Enforcement Probability
The fewer consumers who sue sellers in light of self-serving
terms, the less incentive sellers have to abandon the use of such
terms and, accordingly, the less beneficial it is for sellers to use the
FCA system. Under-enforcement is under-deterrence, and various
factors may lead to consumers' tendency not to sue sellers. Some of
these factors can be considerably modified or even eliminated.
One prominent circumstance where consumers do not sue
sellers with regard to everyday transactions is where small amounts
of money are involved. This is a common scenario, relevant to
many consumer goods. 7 From an efficiency perspective, quite
often an individual consumer is unlikely to bring her case before a
court since her claim is dwarfed by the costs she will incur in
litigation.8 Even when dealing with relatively large amounts of
money, litigants typically do not recover reasonable trial expenses.99
97. For example, a Washington court invalidated a standardized forum selection term
employed by America Online which read that all litigation should take place in Virginia. In
its decision, the court noted, inter alia, that damages suffered by individual consumers are
not likely to exceed $250, thus imposing unreasonable expenses on Washington residents
who seek to launch litigation. Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 106 P.3d 841, 844-45 (Wash. Ct. App.
2005).
98. See, e.g., William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHi. L.
REv. 652, 671-672 (1983) (arguing that, in the context of antitrust, "consumer enforcement
may lead to too few cases being brought and hence to underdeterrence of antitrust viola-
tions").
99. For a discussion of the problem of trial expenses in modern trials and a comment
on its impact in a more general sense, see, for example, Edward L. Rubin, Trial by Battle.
Trial by Argument., 56 ARK. L. REv. 261, 288 (2003) ("The converse problem with relying
upon trial by argument is that many social policies are under-enforced .... Litigation ranges
from being rather expensive, to extremely expensive, to ferociously expensive, to make-your-
hair-stand-up-on-end-knock-your-teeth-out-one-by-one expensive.... Common law was
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By systematically under-compensating plaintiffs for legal and trial
expenses, we make it less valuable for consumers to sue and thus
less attractive for sellers to avoid breaching a contract, refrain from
drafting unfair SFCs, or avoid behaving in a strategic manner. On
the other hand, allowing compensation of non-pecuniary expenses
along with actual legal expenses in consumer cases would result in
increasing consumers' tendency to sue. Inevitably, it would also
increase the potential loss (per case and in total) that sellers face, a
factor that will foster using the proposed system of approval.'00
While the previous explanations for under-deterrence are based
on "pure" economic or efficiency reasons, there are other reasons
that prevent consumers from launching litigation. Since most indi-
viduals tend to be risk averse, '°' the uncertainty which is an
inherent part of litigation might prevent them from asserting their
rights in court. 12 Furthermore, from an emotional perspective, a
trial is an experience that most people find unpleasant.' °" Evi-
dently, it is more unpleasant for individuals than for sophisticated
or repeat-player litigants (such as firms, organizations and institu-• 104
tions) . This provides an additional explanation as to why
consumers tend not to sue sellers with respect to everyday transac-
tions.
Moreover, under-enforcement is likely to occur where consum-
ers are not fully informed with respect to their rights."' It seems
remarkably blind to this difficulty. It devoted enormous attention to the measurement of
damages, but ignored trial expenses .....
100. The suggestion here to compensate for non-pecuniary components and allow real
trial and legal expenses is a general suggestion, which might be applicable to both approved
and non-approved contracts. See infra Part IV.B.2 for suggestions of some more specific and
tailored grounds to distinguish between approved and unapproved contracts in ways that
will increase sellers' motivation to seek approval for their contracts.
101. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 92.
102. See Rubin, supra note 99, at 288-89.
103. See id. at 287-88 ("All these features lead to dread, to elaborate efforts at avoidance
that foreclose actions that would otherwise be taken .... ").
104. For a discussion about the inherent inferiority of ordinary consumers (as "one-shot
players") when litigating against firms (as "repeat players") and its implications to the sub-
stance of consumer SFCs, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211, 243 (1995) ("For the form taker, any given form contract is
normally a one-shot transaction .... For the form giver, however, a form contract is a high-
volume, repeat transaction .... These asymmetrical incentives almost always work to heavily
slant form contracts in favor of form givers." (footnotes omitted)).
105. See Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An
Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE LJ. 369, 395 (1990) ("Promisees some-
times do not sue because they are uninformed about their rights ... ."). For an
acknowledgement of consumers' awareness as one of the factors that influence the volume
of cases brought to courts in the context of medical malpractice, see Betsy A. Rosen, Note,
The 1985 Medical Malpractice Reform Act: The New York State Legislature Responds to the Medical
Malpractice Cisis with a Prescription for Comprehensive Reform, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 135, 138
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that this should be especially troubling when dealing with the less-
educated and the more vulnerable groups of consumers. Also play-
ing an important role are public legal assistance and consumer
organizations. The less available public legal assistance is, the fewer
the interests that will be represented, and the fewer the number of
cases brought by consumers (and consumer organizations) before
the courts. By the same token, the more active consumer organiza-
tions are, and the more leverage they possess, the more likely it is
that enforcement percentage will rise, sellers will not draft ineffi-
cient terms, and as a result, their propensity to approve their
contracts will increase. 10 6
To summarize this point, sellers will tend not to use the approval
mechanism due to under-enforcement. To minimize this problem,
we can (i) consider allowing broader compensation for legal ex-
penses in consumer cases, (ii) better educate consumers as to their
legal rights, and (iii) allow and encourage consumer organizations
to have an active role in the enforcement of consumer rights. This
will not only fight the social harm of under-enforcement, but also
create strong incentives for sellers to use fair and efficient SFCs
and to have them approved.
2. Contract Immunization: Sellers' Probability of Losing
Legal Disputes
The more sensitive courts are to the fact that a contract has been
approved, and the more importance they attribute to it, the more
likely it is that sellers will use this prior approval as an insurance
against future claims. If we want to create incentives for sellers to
use the approving mechanism, we can influence this factor in any
number of ways.
(1986) ("In addition, increased awareness of consumers' rights has led to a rise in the num-
ber of suits brought by dissatisfied patients."). For a general argument in this vein, see
William L. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming Claiming .. , 15 L. & Soc'y REv. 631 (1981).
106. The importance and achievements of consumer organizations and public legal aid
cannot be over-emphasized. For an argument that consumer organizations have an impor-
tant role in mitigating the one-shot/repeat-player problem in the context of consumer-firms
relationship, see Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Con-
tracts: A Callfor-Refonm, 38 Hous. L. REv. 1237,1254-55 (2001) ("In fact, there are many ways
consumers have been able to avoid, or substantially mitigate, the benefits of the repeat-
player .... Specialized legal organizations ... follow litigation on a national front, offer
their expertise and resources to individual players, and help determine which claims should
be appealed to establish the best precedent.").
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(a) Unconscionability. First, we might employ higher stan-
dards for evaluating claims of unconscionability
when dealing with approved SFCs. 1°7 Assuming that
sellers who gain approval use contractual terms that
are substantively and procedurally fair, it might then
follow that approved provisions should enjoy a
greater presumption against unconscionability. At
the same time, sellers who opt not to approve their
contracts may have made this conscious choice
since their contracts are more likely to include un-
fair (or at least problematic) terms. 118 Requiring a
higher burden for unconscionability claims against
approved terms will increase sellers' probability of
losing a case where non-approved contracts are in-
volved. Hence, courts can, on a case-by-case basis,
regard sellers' decisions concerning whether or not
to approve their contracts as an important factor in
examining an unconscionability claim.
(b) The Duty to Read. A different application of the
common law "duty to read" to approved and non-
approved SFCs can promote contractual approval as
well. If consumers have a relaxed duty to read non-
approved contracts, non-approved terms will be
harder to enforce. Imposing extra hardship on sell-
ers who wish to enforce non-approved terms will
provide sellers with another incentive to approve
their SFCs.'09
(c) SFC Interpretation. Another supplementary tool that
can be used as a measure of encouraging sellers to
submit their contracts for approval is the judicial in-
terpretation of SFCs. If the FCA Seal is viewed as a
signal of "best practice," then it might be plausible
to differentiate between contracts with approval and
those without in this respect as well. This can be
done, for instance, when considering whether to al-
low extrinsic evidence to be introduced as part of
the judicial process of contract interpretation. I will
107. For a detailed discussion regarding the unconscionability doctrine, see Robert A.
Hillman, Debunking Some Myths about Unconscionability: A New Framework for U. C. C. Section 2-
302,67 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1981).
108. See supra Part IV.A (noting that unfair terms might be a dominant reason that leads
vendors not to approve contracts).
109. See supra Part III for a more detailed discussion of the common law duty to read
contracts and its interaction with the proposed FCA.
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expand a bit on this idea in the paragraphs that fol-
low.
In general, current law holds that courts enjoy a high degree of
discretion in the process of contract interpretation. Section 2-202
of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), for example, provides
that extrinsic evidence can "explain or supplement" the contract
writing, though not "contradict" it. The Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts ("Restatement")-which rejects the idea that contract terms
have a "plain meaning"-applies a relatively subjective context-
sensitive standard as a guideline for contract interpretation.
Similar to the UCC, the Restatement allows extrinsic evidence as part
of the interpretation process."' Common law courts have generally
followed this path.
Commentators argue that in the context of commercial con-
tracts between sophisticated parties-such as large firms-courts
should abandon the flexible attitude and apply a more "textualist"
attitude as the default theory of interpretation."' Such approach is
strongly justified in contracts executed among sophisticated and
experienced firms. Yet, I believe a different default theory should
be considered for the interpretation of consumer SFCs. In my view,
courts should be vested with wide discretion to admit extrinsic evi-
dence when dealing with non-approved contracts while taking a
stingier approach towards extrinsic evidence in pre-approved con-
tract cases. One possible explanation for this distinction should be
noted here. If we assume that non-approved terms are trickier for
consumers, it is then plausible that unfavorable terms are more
frequently accompanied by sellers' oral explanation or advertise-
ment, aimed at mitigating consumers' concerns with respect to the
contract's content"2 or shifting their focus to other product charac-
teristics.
Since sellers dominate the drafting process and have the ability
to tailor their SFCs according to their needs, allowing extrinsic evi-
dence in the process of contract interpretation is likely to
undermine their interests as incorporated into contractual terms.
It will likely increase a seller's probability of losing a case, while
complicating litigation and raising its costs. This, in turn, will cre-
ate another incentive for sellers to approve their contracts, by
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209-217 (1978) and accompanying
official comments.
111. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 92, at 568-92.
112. Such representations, for instance, can take the form of explaining why the danger
and the likelihood that those one-sided terms will afflict consumers are low and thus should
be ignored.
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blocking, at least to some degree, consumers' attempts to intro-
duce extrinsic evidence that might be unfavorable to sellers.
(d) Expanding Approval Immunity. The other side of the
coin is augmenting the scope of immunity accorded
to pre-approved contracts. In achieving this goal we
might consider the following aspects: the time-
frame for which approved terms are immune from
legal claims, the scope of the immunity (i.e., what
array of claims are basically excluded from discus-
sion once raised against approved contract terms),
the burden of proof on consumers who argue
against standardized provisions, the kind of evi-
dence that is allowed and required in order to
challenge the ordinary meaning of approved terms,
and so on. Clearly, the stronger the immunity the
approval carries, the more likely it is that sellers will
use it.
3. Contact Approval & Supra-compensation
Punishing and deterring defendants, compensating plaintiffs,
and inducing potential plaintiffs to take legal actions are among
the most classic objectives of damages remedies in the common
law."4 In contract law, remedies are traditionally designed to com-
pensate the promisee for the loss resulting from a contract breach,
rather than to force the breaching party to perform' 5 or to punish
him for his breach." 6 Because compensation is perceived to be the
113. The terms supra-compensation, over-compensation and punitive damages will be
used interchangeably in order to refer to legal awards that exceed the compensatory level of
an aggrieved party. It should be clarified here that the term "punitive damages" ought not to
be understood simply as a punishment. In most cases, there might be other justifications for
this award (rather than "punishment"). See Edward L. Rubin, Punitive Damages: Reconceptual-
izingtheRuncibleRemedies of Common Law, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 131 (1998).
114. Id. at 136.
115. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv.
1145, 1147 (1970) ("Our system, then, is not directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent
breach; rather, it is aimed at relief to promisees to redress breach." (emphasis omitted)).
116. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Plural-
ism, 42 Am. U. L. R~v. 1393, 1404 (1993) ("Generally, American civil law views its remedial
purposes as distinct from punishment .... In short, the law is hostile to carrying out the
parties' contractual scheme to punish the breaching party.").
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desired norm, many legal scholars have repeatedly argued that pu-
nitive damages are inappropriate in contract cases.117
Current legislation follows the anti-punitive damages path, and
the general rule is that punitive damages should not be assessed
for a breach of contract per se. Section 355 of the Restatement pro-
vides that "[p] unitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of
contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort
for which punitive damages are recoverable. '".8 Similarly, section 1-
106 of the UCC endorses the expectation interest principle, while
the official comment negates the concept of punitive damages."9
Accordingly, an empirical survey conducted in 1999 by William
Dodge revealed that thirty-nine American jurisdictions do not al-
low punitive damages for contract breach unless the plaintiff can
establish the existence of an independent tort, while twelve juris-
dictions do allow punitive damages in contract cases, but only
under limited circumstances.
2 0
From a law and economics perspective, punitive damages are
usually perceived to be anomalous in contract law for two promi-
nent reasons. First, punitive damages undermine the basic
principle of "efficient breach." Since performance will occur even
where breach would be more efficient, ex post, punitive damages
result in inefficient performances.12' The theory of "efficient
breach" is now employed by scholars, legislatures and courts as an
ordinary explanation of why punitive damages should not be
awarded in contract cases. 2 2 The second major explanation against
punitive damages in contract law is based on an ex ante observation.
From an ex ante perspective (and even if parties can re-negotiate
before breaching the contract), parties consider precautions that
can decrease the possibility of breach. Allowing punitive damages
thus creates incentives to take excessive and unjustified precau-
tions.
117. See, e.g., 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1077 (1964); 11
SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H. E. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1340 (3d ed.
1968).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1979).
119. U.C.C. § 1-106 cmt. 1 (2000) (stating that contractual remedies "do not include
consequential or special damages, or penal damages ...." (emphasis added)).
120. William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 644-
45 (1999).
121. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 131 (5th ed. 1998). For a
challenge of the economic perspective, see, for example, Dodge, supra note 120; Galanter &
Luban, supra note 116.
122. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 120, at 630-31. Many courts have grounded their oppo-
sition to punitive damages on an economic analysis. See, e.g., Thyssen, Inc. v. S.S. Fortune
Star, 777 F.2d 57, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1985); Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington,
Inc., 608 N.E.2d 975 (Ind. 1993).
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However, this analysis should not be understood to argue that
punitive damages never can be justified from an efficiency stand-
point. Even from a law and economics perspective, punitive
damages might be acceptable in under-enforcement cases. 12 3 Since
not all aggrieved parties sue, promisors that consistently breach
their contracts are generally well-situated. This is especially true
where factors like legal expenses for prevailing litigants and repu-
tation damage due to consumers' suits are relatively negligible. By
allowing over-compensation the law can respond to the problem of
under-enforcement.
While the concept of allowing supra-compensation in these cases
is just and efficient in theory, it is difficult to implement in prac-
tice. Usually, it is very problematic to know how much to add to the
plaintiffs loss, and awkward to estimate with any accuracy how
many aggrieved parties did not sue and what quantum of damages
they faced. 124 Obviously, this question is particularly difficult in dy-
namic markets, where the degree of under-enforcement varies
from time to time and from one industry to the other. Further-
more, allowing punitive damages changes the set of considerations
consumers face when deciding whether to bring a suit to court.
Once punitive damages are allowed, the degree of under-
enforcement is likely to change.
2 5
Nevertheless, one additional way to broaden the potential aver-
age loss for sellers who opt to use non-approved SFCs is by
considering supra-compensation. In this context, there might be a
few justifications which rationalize a more relaxed attitude towards
over-compensation for non-approved contract terms. I consider
those explanations next.
(a) Lowering/Shiing the Burden of Proof Sellers who do
not obtain contractual approval are more likely to
gain from under-enforcement. This premise might
be especially true if we assume that approved con-
123. Another category of contract cases that might justify punitive damages are those
involving opportunistic, rather than efficient, breaches. See Dodge, supra note 120, at 632
n.14 (referring to a large number of references that support this argument). Yet, it seems
plausible to assume that opportunistic breaches are a negligible factor in SFC cases.
124. The Supreme Court has recently ruled that basing punitive damages awards on
harm to parties not before the court is a violation of the Due Process Clause. Philip Morris
USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007). Though the issue of class actions may be related to
this analysis, it is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, this approach is not only prob-
lematic, but may no longer be permissible. For further elaboration on possible relation
between the two remedies, see, for example, Francesco Parisi & Marta Cenini, Punitive
Damages and Class Actions (Sept. 6, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN ID1265022_code702020.pdf?abstractid=126451 l&mirid=5.
125. See Schwartz, supra note 105, at 402-03.
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tracts are less likely to include unfair terms that
might result in legal disputes or consumers' exploi-
tation. Hence, when dealing with approved
contracts, even if the probability of enforcement
does not change, the pool of aggrieved consumers
gets smaller, and the benefit that the seller can gain
from incorporating one-sided terms (insofar as they
can be mistakenly approved) is correlatively re-
duced.
Another possible argument for distinguishing between approved
and non-approved contracts in this context is that unfair terms may
prevent buyers from bringing their cases before courts in the first
place, 26 especially where buyers are not fully aware that the terms
at stake may be invalidated.1 27 Where approval means immunity
against consumers' suits, it might make sense to lower the burden
of proof faced by aggrieved buyers who seek punitive damages to
encourage litigation against unscrupulous sellers."2 In other words,
using a lower burden for awarding punitive damages for non-
approved contract terms will correspond with the likelihood that a
seller will benefit from under-enforcement because of inclusion of
unfair terms.
An additional idea worth examining would be an approach
where prima facie evidence of under-enforcement shifts the bur-
den of proof to sellers who did not gain approval for their
contracts. Recall that the practical problem of proving the degree
of under-enforcement is one of the main reasons for which puni-
tive damages are deemed inappropriate from an economic
perspective. By the same token, utilization of the approving
mechanism-which has the potential of minimizing under-
enforcement-is a precaution that only sellers can take. Following
this logic, it seems reasonable to not allow sellers to benefit from
consumers' inability to satisfy the level of proof that is required in
order to be awarded punitive damages where an available tool that
decreases under-enforcement is at hand.
126. See Dennis P. Stolle & AndrewJ. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas:
A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers' Propensity to Sue, 15
BEHAV. Scl. & L. 83 (1997).
127. On the face of it, this argument can defeat itself since it is even more valid when
dealing with approved terms. For example, it is very unlikely that consumers will try to attack
approved contract terms that enjoy immunity. However, it should be clear that this danger is
not a challenging one since approved contract terms are presumed to be fair.
128. This is an aside of the normative goal of deterring opportunistic behavior. See supra
note 123.
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Two more concrete scenarios can be noted here. The first occurs
when a plaintiff can show that there is some level of
under-enforcement, but its exact degree cannot be clearly proved.
Alternatively, it might be that a plaintiff cannot prove
under-enforcement in his particular case, but he can prove under-
enforcement in similar fields of commerce. The proposal here is
that in such cases, courts will shift the burden of proof, insofar as
under-enforcement is at stake, to sellers who opted not to gain ap-
proval.1
29
(b) Minimizing Litigation. Allowing punitive damages en-
larges individuals' potential benefit from legal
disputes and thus provides a higher motivation for
plaintiffs to litigate. Though punitive damages are
awarded much less frequently than usually as-
sumed, ° these relatively small numbers of cases
that enjoy a high degree of publicity and public at-
tention have a powerful effect on potential
plaintiffs. 3' Since the costs of litigation are basically
socially wasted, punitive damages may be undesir-
able as a factor encouraging excessive litigation.
3 2
This rationale can be applied in order to attain a somewhat con-
trary conclusion in our context. Getting a contract approved is a
precaution that sellers can take against legal claims, thus avoiding,
inter alia, the risk of paying punitive damages. Allowing punitive
damages for unapproved contracts might increase litigation, but
only with regard to unapproved contracts. Accordingly, this will pro-
vide sellers with an additional incentive to approve their contracts.
129. In this respect, the idea expressed here is similar in some ways to Amar's idea
about searches. According to Amar, a search warrant (which can be viewed as an ex ante
approval given by an objective third-party) can be viewed and used as an immunity from
damages claims in relation to criminal searches, while searches that are conducted without a
warrant should be exposed to potential damages liability. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights
as a Constitution, 100YALE L.J. 1131, 1175-81 (1991).
130. See Galanter & Luban, supra note 116, at 1411-15 (referring to and relying on a
few studies that exhaustively traced punitive damages award cases).
131. Judge Kozinski, for example, has regarded punitive damages as "a golden carrot
that entices into court parties who might otherwise be inclined to resolve their differences."
Oki America, Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
132. See, e.g., Galanter & Luban, supra note 116, at 1410 ("Those who are affronted and
alarmed by what they see as excessive litigiousness often target punitive damages as a major
problem."). Yet, as Dodge acknowledges, when it comes to punitive damages arising from a
breach of contract, there is also a plausible assertion that allowing punitive damages will
decrease litigation. Dodge, supra note 120, at 691 ("[Mlaking punitive damages available for
willful breach of contract will encourage promisors who would previously have been inclined
to breach to negotiate with their promisees for releases.").
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Where sellers are afforded the option to immunize their SFCs, li-
ability for punitive damages will likely also be precluded. Thus, the
availability of punitive damages will create incentives for contract
approval that should substantially reduce litigation. Put differently,
since sellers are the ones who can make use of this proposed pre-
caution and are the lowest cost-avoiders, exposing them to punitive
damages when they opt not to approve their contracts will provide
an additional strong incentive for using the FCA mechanism.3
(c) Political and Social Values in Consumer Protection Policy.
In Western liberal cultures, it is believed that gov-
ernments ought to be restrained and limited from
regulating every area of life. Yet this fundamental
approach leaves a lot of space for private entities
and initiatives, which can sometimes gain enormous
power. The vast power that is obtained by large cor-
porations might, in some cases, conflict with
individual freedom and allow brutal interference in
the private sphere and in individual private lives. In
order to keep and enhance the concept of en-
forcement endowments, punitive damages are
normatively desired since they "encourage a plural-
ist dispersal of law enforcement responsibility."
34
This, in turn, helps to minimize the chances that
conglomerates will indeed have the ability to
threaten the private sphere.
Against this general background it is worth noting that some-
times there are fundamental rights (e.g., human dignity, privacy
and freedom of contracts) that are infringed by sellers who exploit
consumers or treat them in a degrading manner via SFCs and un-
fair contracting practices. 13 5 1 further believe that this kind of social
harm for consumers is generally under-estimated, under-enforced
and consequently under-compensated. This is especially true since
133. Theoretically, this could turn out to be a double-edged sword. There is still a dan-
ger that allowing punitive damages when dealing with non-approved contracts will create a
large volume of litigation which will not be offset by the amount of litigation that is reduced
due to pre-approved SFCs. Yet this danger is not that severe. It may be efficient to allow
punitive damages for contract breach since the breaching party can usually re-negotiate with
the other party for a release. This renegotiation is likely to be cheaper than the costs of
litigation necessary to determine the expectation damages of an aggrieved party. See Dodge,
supra note 120, at 675.
134. Galanter and Luban, supra note 116, at 1446.
135. In a way, this argument resembles Kant's maxim of treating humans as objects,
rather than means. For an interesting attempt to provide an ideal of respectful community
that promises and contracts create, see Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE
L.J. 1417 (2004).
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often it is the more vulnerable and less-represented groups of
consumers who are exposed to this kind of behavior."' Supra-
compensation, therefore, can serve as a "norm projection" which
guarantees that firms will not under-estimate some social values
and norms. 37 Similarly, it can help to promote strict compliance,
regardless of efficiency concerns or the degree of under-
enforcement. If we believe that some norms and rules justify strict
compliance,' we might conclude that punitive damages are ajusti-
fiable means to achieve such compliance. For all these various
reasons, allowing such damages can serve as an important measure
to address infringement of consumers' rights.
39
136. An additional argument is that, where contractual relations are characterized with
a high degree of dependence and trust, fiduciary principles justify punitive damages. A
common example is a bad faith breach of an insurance contract. See Dodge, supra note 120,
at 636-37 (detailing other exceptions for awarding punitive damages and pointing out this
rationale). Additional consumer products and services that could be part of this group are,
for instance, those provided by banks, credit cards and utility companies, and technical
support for essential merchandise.
137. That a norm or a value is under-estimated is a problematic issue which involves
normative considerations beyond the scope of this Article. At this stage, it is enough to point
out that punitive damages can serve as a norm projection, signaling the resentment of the
law toward a given behavior or attitude. See Luban & Galanter, supra note 116, at 1430-32.
138. Human dignity, an abstract non-pecuniary notion, might serve as an important ex-
ample, as it is not frequently compensated for in consumer contract cases. Many people do
not feel comfortable assigning a price to such a value, as it is difficult to prove and quantify
it as a matter of damages, some people would rather respond to private insults or humilia-
tions outside of the legal system, and others would feel that bringing their case to court is
likely to deepen their embarrassment or frustration. With this as a background, one may
better understand the argument that punitive damages "are perhaps the most important
instrument in the legal repertoire for pronouncing moral disapproval of economically for-
midable offenders." Id. at 1428. The authors further explain in detail the rationale that
follows the retribution argument, which in turn relies on Hampton's analysis of retribution.
According to this analysis, firms as wrongdoers sometimes consider themselves as especially
valuable, whereas the customer (the victim) is degraded to a "low" person-one that does
not matter that much and thus "deserves" to be treated badly. Id.
139. To be sure, there are practical countervailing arguments not to allow punitive
damages awards. One important argument is that juries are not a reliable institution for
transforming a moral consensus to a dollar amount award. See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kah-
neman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in
Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998). Accordingly, scholars have suggested some means to over-
come or minimize this alleged problem. See Dodge, supra note 120, at 696 ("For example, a
majority of states now require that a plaintiff prove the conduct warranting punitive dam-
ages by clear and convincing evidence. Review by the trial judge and by appellate courts may
also limit excessive punitive damages awards. Or a state might choose to vest the decision of
how much, if any, punitive damages to award in the judge rather than the jury ... ." (foot-
notes omitted)). Closely related, it is also argued that juries are vested with too much
discretion when awarding punitive damages, a fact that introduces unpredictability to con-
tractual relations. See Dodge, supra note 120, at 695 (citing Judge Kozinski). For this reason,
Rubin suggests that juries should substitute "moral outrage" with compliance, which is as-
sumed by him to be a more concrete object "with obvious sources of empirical data that can
be used to measure it." Rubin, supra note 113, at 150. Yet, others argue that the fear of exag-
gerated punitive damages awards is overblown, as empirical data demonstrates that such
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Arguably, one of the purposes of approving contracts is minimiz-
ing such exploitation and infringement of fundamental rights by
sellers. It is then reasonable to argue that sellers who do not seek
approval for their contracts are more inclined to use unfair terms
or practices which exercise such exploitation. Thus, sellers who
choose not to approve their SFCs are more likely to infringe rights
without fully compensating for their harms. Allowing punitive
damages when dealing with unapproved contracts can help offset
this undesirable situation. To make this proposal more complete, I
further suggest allocating a substantial part of these punitive dam-
ages awards to the FCAO. This practice will prevent unjustified
windfalls and, at the same time, help finance the FCA system.
To summarize, a more relaxed attitude towards punitive dam-
ages under the framework sketched here will achieve a few
important objectives. First, it will provide sellers with another in-
centive to use the FCA system. Second, it will increase consumers'
motivation to sue sellers for harms derived out of unfair
non-approved provisions. This will address, at least in part,
under-deterrence and under-compensation. Third, it will project
important values, encourage compliance with valuable norms, and
enhance pluralist dispersion of law enforcement accountability.
Last, as a byproduct, allocating a substantial part of punitive dam-
ages awards to the FCAO will assist in financing its activities.
4. "Interaction Costs": Approval Costs and Fees
High expenses associated with prior approval will lead sellers to
refrain from using it. Among other things, it is necessary to con-
sider whether sellers should pay a fee for contract approval, how
this fee should be determined, and, if and where contract approval
is a mandatory requirement, how that should influence the ap-
proval fee. 40 Accordingly, an effort should be made to provide
approvals in a timely fashion while minimizing procedural and
administrative requirements. While these ideas are self-evident in
theory, implementing them in practice may not be that easy. All of
these considerations have important consequences for the
awards are relatively infrequent and reasonable in size. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne
Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1990).
140. For a discussion of this issue, see infra Part VI.C. It is also important to note that
out-of-pocket costs are likely to influence-at least to some degree-product and services
prices. It is reasonable to assume that sellers will try to distribute at least some of these addi-
tional costs to the general pool of consumers by increasing the prices of products and
services. For further discussion, see infra Part VII.B.
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institutional composition of the FCAO, its procedures, its stan-
dards, and its funding. I will return to this issue below.1
41
C. Incentives for Consumers
Up to this point we have focused on the perspective of sellers,
trying to provide them with an array of incentives sufficient to in-
duce them to use the FCA mechanism of prior approval. As a
supplementary factor, if consumers are encouraged to shop for ap-
proved contracts, sellers will be even more inclined to use this
system.
There are some reasons for consumers to shop for approved
contracts. First is the promise of quality that approval is supposed
to carry. Consumers are likely to prefer approved contracts that
have been examined by an expert institution, rather than examin-
ing the contract themselves or simply ignoring the contract they
enter. Under the framework developed here, consumers can actu-
ally use the FCAO as an agent (or a third party) that is equipped
with superior knowledge, experience, and incentives and thus is
able to overcome their own biases and mistakes. An additional in-
fluence over consumers' decisions to shop for approved contracts
is related to the application of the duty to read discussed above. 42
Recall that consumers would be exempted from reading the fine
print of approved SFCs. This exemption should further induce
consumers to shop for pre-approved contracts.'43
141. See infra Part VI.
142. See supra Part III.
143. One might argue that giving approved contracts a strong immunity against legal
claims will undermine consumers' tendency to shop for approved contracts. The somewhat
counter-intuitive rationale behind this assertion is that consumers may be disinclined to give
up their legal right to sue sellers on the basis of contractual terms incorporated into SFCs.
Yet, I do not find this argument persuasive as it attributes too much rationality and sophisti-
cation to consumers. Even if consumers do care and value the right to dispute unfair
provisions, there is no basis to assume that they will favor this right over a third-party
contractual guarantee. Ex ante, consumers are likely to devalue such rights due to over-
optimism. Ex post, as noted, many different reasons lead consumers not to engage in legal
disputes against large firms.
Additionally, the idea that consumers might care deeply about such rights overlooks the
fact that, in many SFCs, the fundamental right to sue sellers is firmly restricted by arbitration
clauses. It also ignores peoples' uncomfortable feelings that are inherent to litigation and
neglects to acknowledge the fact that many consumers trust their assertiveness and aggres-
siveness, rather than the contract language, to solve disputes ex post. While extremely
sophisticated consumers might favor unapproved contracts (since those contracts are much
easier to attack in courts), there is no reason to conclude that the majority of consumers
would exercise a similar preference.
[VOL. 42:4
A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism
The analysis here assumes that consumers will be able to distin-
guish easily among approved and non-approved contracts and
contract terms. Hence, it might be reasonable to consider imposing
on sellers a duty to clearly indicate the fact of contractual approval
on the face of their contracts, rather than just allowing them to do
so.' T This will not only guarantee that consumers will indeed be
able to realize that a contract has been approved, but might
achieve other positive consequences as well. It can serve as an indi-
cation for potential buyers that there is no reason to carefully read
approved terms, thus economizing on their time and limited atten-
tion. Furthermore, it can provide buyers with a better
understanding as to the prospects of launching litigation and dis-
puting the terms they accept. It will also increase the likelihood
that SFCs will become a patent aspect from consumers' perspective
and, closely related, it might also promote competition among
sellers to engage in contract approval.
1 5
D. The Case for Mandatory Approval
A discussion of the incentives for using the FCA system presup-
poses that sellers are not obliged, as a mandatory requirement, to
submit their contracts for approval. The preference for such a vol-
untarily regime is based on the idea that the system can, and
should, create incentives for both sellers and consumers to use the
approval mechanism. A few additional factors support a preference
for a voluntary rather than a mandatory system. First, a mandatory
approval system requires the FCAO to be equipped with abundant
resources, such as a large body of employees and specialists from
various fields.1 46 Second, it undermines some fundamental con-
cepts about the freedom of contracts, since it invites a harsh
intrusion into the market of contract terms. Third, a mandatory
regime is also likely to encounter serious opposition from strong
144. The Good Housekeeping Institute, for instance, does not require sellers to include
the certification seal on their products. Indeed, there are many manufacturers who opt not
to do so. There might be various reasons for this phenomenon which may be valid to our
context as well. See supra note 23. Additionally, the Israeli Standard Contracts Law does not
impose such a duty, and some sellers indeed opt not to indicate the fact of approval on the
face of their contracts. See supra note 42.
145. If we are nonetheless reluctant to impose on sellers a duty to indicate contractual
approval, we might consider ways to encourage them to do so. One way would be to charge a
lower approval fee for approved contracts that noticeably indicate the fact of approval on
the face of the approved contracts than is charged for approval of contracts that do not so
indicate.
146. See infra Part VI.A.
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interest groups that represent business interests. Businesses, as re-
peat players, have ample incentives to undermine the value of such
a system.
However, we might yet wish to consider a mandatory approval
requirement in restricted areas of commerce or specific types of
contracts. 47 Four kinds of markets (or combinations thereof) that
should be strictly scrutinized are: (i) markets that are associated
with consistent cognitive problems, 14 (ii) markets where consum-
ers have much at stake and limited opportunity to gain experience
and knowledge (as typical one-shot players),"4 (iii) markets that
address vulnerable types of consumers, such as elderly people or
those who are not familiar with the local language or culture, and
(iv) markets that are associated with a particularly high volume of
activity.' 50 Thus, although in most fields of commerce a voluntary
regime should be preferred, some exceptions might be justified on
one of the grounds mentioned here.
V. THE CASE OF MISTAKEN APPROVAL
Certain mistakes are thought to be inevitable. While many mis-
takes are of no legal importance, some mistakes influence others'
actions, legal rights and entitlements. The law is called upon to
address the latter kind of mistakes.'5' In contract law, for instance,
mistakes are usually discussed in the context of contract forma-
147. See Mann, supra note 75.
148. Suspect fields include rent-to-own transactions, insurance contracts, and credit
card agreements. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 4; Becher, supra note 4.
149. A good example of a market that combines these two characteristics is purchasing
a house. Since buying a house is the most significant and expensive transaction the average
family enters and there is substantial potential for psychological limitations, this market is
one that deserves special scrutiny. For a broad discussion, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., One
Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psycho-
logical Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083 (1984).
150. By imposing certain limits on the number of transactions that can be made with a
non-approved SFC, we can get at the most commonly used consumer contracts (i.e., mainly
those used by the most powerful firms) while not imposing too high a burden on all retailers
and the approving body. Under this category we might include bank agreements, credit
cards contracts, rent and sale of cars, flight tickets, and the like. A similar approach has
already been used by the USDA. As noted in Part I.B., small businesses are exempted from
the USDA Organic Inspection mechanism as long as they do not sell more than a specific,
relatively low, annual amount.
151. See Hanoch Dagan, Mistakes, 79 TEx. L. REv. 1795, 1795-96 (2001) ("Many of these
[human] mistakes are inconsequential or self regarding .... Law is invoked, however, when
more than one person is involved in the drama."). In his article, Dagan discusses mistakes
with regard to unilateral conferral of benefits. Another kind of mistake which is discussed in
the literature is one that involves compromises. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most
Cases Settle" Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994).
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tion.5 2 In our context, consumers might fear being left with the
burden to pay for the negative consequences associated with erro-
neous approvals. This concern might undermine consumers' trust
in the approving institution. Thus, it is necessary to consider what
should happen when contract approval is given (or denied) by mis-
take.
The situation to be examined is the following: a consumer signs
an approved contract (e.g., for furniture shipment service) without
reading its content and while relying on its approval. The approved
contract contains a term which exempts the seller (in our case, the
service provider/mover) from liability for damage to the shipped
items even if the damage was deliberately caused by the service
provider or his employees. Later on, the shipped items are dam-
aged, and it turns out the seller's employee damaged them
deliberately. The service provider insists that, according to the ap-
proved contract, the risk in such an event should be allocated to
the buyer. Further, assume that the approval was given by mistake,
since the release of liability for deliberate damage would normally
be deemed unfair. All actors in this scenario allegedly behave in
good faith: the consumer when relying on the approval, the seller
when asking for it, and the approving body when granting it.
This scenario raises two primary issues. First, it is necessary to
determine who should bear the financial risk for the mistaken ap-
proval. Second, it is important to clarify who should bear the
burden to litigate and take legal action in light of such mistakes. By
exploring these questions, we will also make a preliminary deter-
mination as to what kind of liability an approval should bear (if at
all) and whether approval by the FCAO is exposed to judicial re-
view and judicial modification. Each of these questions embraces a
secondary set of related issues examined below.
A. The FCAO Should Bear the Financial Risk
One might argue for a caveat emptor rationale that justifies allo-
cating the risks to consumers. According to this line of reasoning,
facing a mistake is one of the risks that consumers encounter in
return for being able to rely on (regularly valid) approvals. How-
ever, the flaws of this approach are quite apparent. First, from an
economic perspective, holding consumers liable for mistaken ap-
provals will induce consumers to take excessive precautions ex ante.
152. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, Liability for Mistake in Contract Formation, 64 S. CAL. L. REv.
1 (1990).
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It will also undercut their confidence and willingness to rely on the
proposed mechanism. Moreover, if consumers are left with the
burden of bearing the financial risks that follow mistaken approv-
als, it will eliminate most of the consumers' incentive to initiate
legal actions against mistaken approvals. This, in turn, will reduce
the ability of the legal system to correct such mistakes and mitigate
the negative effects of unfair provisions. Furthermore, allocating
the risk to consumers contradicts our sense of fairness, since con-
sumers in such cases do not have a reasonable way to avoid such
liability. It seems unfair to hold consumers liable for terms that
they are no longer under a duty to read and with which they did
not have a chance to become acquainted. This is especially true
once we recall that one main purpose of this system is to encour-
age consumers to shop for approved SFCs and free consumers
from the burden of reading them. Therefore, a rule that holds
consumers liable for mistaken approvals would undermine many of
the principles that support the FCA solution.
Neither does it seem reasonable to hold sellers liable for mis-
taken approvals. Such a system might result in excessive
precautions taken by sellers. As before, this option contradicts our
sense of fairness. Sellers who apply for an approval in good faith
should not be held responsible for mistakes that are not within
their control. Moreover, if the approval that is given to contracts is
not reliable and does not contain a good degree of insurance
against mistakes, it might discourage sellers from using the ap-
proval mechanism. Again, one can argue that this is a risk that
sellers have to face while enjoying the merits of this system. This
argument is not credible. The FCAO should be able to provide sel-
lers with solid approvals, which will serve sellers' interests and allow
them to plan and invest resources based on the approval they
gained. This is especially true if we recall that the main hurdle to
making this system operational is sellers' willingness to use it.
1 53
Therefore, the risk for mistaken approvals should be allocated
to the approving body. Several arguments provide further support.
First, it follows our intuition about fairness, as it is grounded on a
normative attitude which aspires to respect individuals' autonomy.
People should be held liable for their mistakes and should not be
allowed to pass on the negative consequences of their actions ab-
sent a compelling reason. An additional possible fairness
consideration, from a distributive justice standpoint, is that we
should avoid enriching the general public at the expense of one
firm or an individual consumer. In other words, we might prefer
153. Sellers' incentives are discussed in detail in Part IV.
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not placing the liability of mistaken approval on private parties
where society as a whole (i.e., the general pool of consumers and
sellers) benefits from having SFCs examined and approved by an
independent third-party.
1 5 4
Allocating the risk of mistaken approval to the FCAO is justified
on an efficiency basis as well. The approving body is the best cost-
avoider. The approving institute has the relevant information in
assessing the terms at stake. 5 5 It has a broad perspective, which al-
lows it to best evaluate the risk of an error. In addition, the FCAO
is the best avoider since such errors occur in a process that is under
its control, authority and supervision. Therefore, the approving
institution should be able to develop procedures that will be effec-
tive in mistake-reduction. Moreover, holding the approving body
liable for its mistakes provides the FCAO with a powerful incentive
to perform its work in a careful manner.1 5 6 It will also increase the
likelihood that the approving body will learn from its mistakes and
implement necessary changes that can minimize the prospect that
mistakes will recur.
Another justification for allocating the costs of mistaken approv-
als to the approving body should be outlined here. Facing the risk
of irreversible mistakes, people might tend to avoid interactions
they would otherwise have or might take excessive precautions be-
fore engaging in socially desirable interactions. As Dagan asserts,
"[b] oth alternatives are not only wasteful from an economic stand-
point, they are also harmful to autonomy," since these
circumstances "may lead people to interact with one another in an
intolerably thoroughgoing, rigid fashion.' '5 7 Knowing that con-
sumers and sellers will not be held liable for the financial
consequences of mistaken approvals will better allow them to re-
lieve their interactions from this burden.
To be sure, one can argue that there are some flaws in allocating
the risk of mistaken approvals to the approving body. One such
argument is that people and institutions are better positioned for
estimating their own losses, rather than requiring assessment of
losses that might occur to unknown third parties. Thus, the
154. Cf Gergen, supra note 152, at 48 ("It may be significant that the issue in these cases
is the allocation of a loss between the government and a private party and not the allocation
of a loss between two private parties, if we find the prospect troubling that all of society
might be enriched at the expense of the one firm." (footnote omitted)).
155. See id. at 19-20 (proposing that the loss due to mistakes in contract formation
should be allocated to the party who has superior relevant information).
156. Dagan further argues that financial institutions are more responsive to these kinds
of incentives than individuals. Dagan, supra note 151, at 1820.
157. Dagan, supra note 151, at 1799-1800 (footnotes omitted).
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argument goes, the FCAO is likely to have problems in assessing
the risk of mistaken approval since it will have to evaluate other
unknown and undefined parties' potential losses.
This argument has some merit, but it does not outweigh the
other considerations that support assigning the risk to the approv-
ing body. This is especially true since the FCAO, as an institution,
should have superior ability to insure and spread the costs of mis-
taken approvals. Under appropriate circumstances, moreover, the
FCAO might limit the insurance coverage given by the approving
body to a fixed amount, expecting consumers and sellers to take
their own precautions where important and very expensive transac-
tions are at stake.
One clarification might be required at this point. The analysis
and conclusion presented here is based on the simplifying assump-
tion that liability for mistaken approval should not be divided
between different parties. If we relax this assumption, we might
reach a somewhat different conclusion. One possibility is that,
where institutions confer mistaken benefits on individuals (in our
case, sellers), the most efficient liability rule declares that individu-
als are held liable for a limited fixed sum, whereas the mistaken
institution is held responsible for the remaining amount.5 9 In this
respect, forming a simple liability rule that will be easy to adjudi-
cate and apply is necessary in order to minimize litigation.
Though well justified, the conclusion that the approval organiza-
tion should be liable for mistaken approval has an enormous
influence on the organization and on the way it should function.
Under this understanding, the FCAO should be able to provide the
market not only with professional inspection of SFCs, but also with
some degree of assurance that its approvals will be done in a com-
petent, faithful, and non-negligent way.1 60 The approval should be
158. Determining the exact amount of this limited fixed-amount liability is a context-
dependent challenge that will not be undertaken here.
159. This is done, for instance, in the context of credit card agreements between credit
card companies and consumers. Dagan justifies this rule on a few grounds. First, it avoids
administrative costs associated with the determination of losses. Dagan, supra note 151, at
1819. Second, the asymmetric liability rule is supported by the presumption that "institu-
tions are usually better positioned than individuals to insure, self-insure, or otherwise spread
the losses that cannot be avoided." Id. (footnote omitted). In addition, individuals and insti-
tutions have a different mistake-avoidance capacity. Id. at 1818-20. See also Robert D. Cooter
& Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 63
(1987). Cooter and Rubin's article inspires Dagan's discussion.
160. Reducing negligent mistakes, however, does not eliminate the possibility of errors
in judgments which can result in mistaken approvals. By the same token, it should be clear
that the approval organization will be held liable for all kinds of mistaken approvals,
whether negligent or not. If the FCAO were to be held liable only for negligent mistaken
approvals, it would result in (i) excessive litigation (aimed at determining whether negli-
[VOL. 42:4
A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism
supplemented with a sort of insurance against losses that might be
incurred by the market participants because of mistaken approv-
als. 
161
B. The Burden to Initiate Legal Action
Accepting the conclusion that the approving institution should
be liable for its mistakes and provide insurance for buyers and sell-
ers, we should next inquire about the best way to revoke mistaken
approvals. 162 Since consumers are those who enter approved con-
tracts and have the incentive to guarantee the existence of "best
practice" terms, consumers are naturally the ones that should have
the burden of initiating legal action that will challenge mistaken
approvals. 6 3 Relying on consumers to launch litigation, however, is
problematic. As explained above, 64 many factors might prevent
consumers from bringing their cases before the courts. Therefore,
if the system wishes to rely on consumers to mitigate the problem
of mistaken approvals, one must consider other alternatives-
rather than litigation-that should be available for consumers and
consumer groups to attack provisions that were mistakenly ap-
proved.
gence is the case); and (ii) the undermining of an important part of the approval's signifi-
cance and purpose (as cautious buyers would nevertheless read approved contracts to assure
there are non-negligent mistakes insofar as they trust their knowledge, experience or exper-
tise to reveal such mistakes).
161. If an approval is found to be mistaken, it should be revoked. The immediate ef-
fects of repealing an approval would be twofold. First, the approval organization would have
to reimburse the party who incurred losses as a result of a mistaken approval. This compen-
sation should include losses suffered as a product of the mistaken approval itself as well as
litigation (or other incidental) expenses. Second, the seller would be barred from indicating
the approval on future contracts (i.e., the approval would be deemed void). In such cases,
sellers would arguably have to incur the direct losses derived from an invalidation of a previ-
ously given approval, and the indirect costs that will result from the need to avoid the use of
previously printed contracts that specify the fact of approval.
162. An implied assumption in this analysis of approval invalidation is that SFCs
brought before the FCAO for examination would not be exposed to pre-approval attacks by
consumers and consumer organizations. This is so since the preferred regime is one that will
generally avoid creating an adversarial procedure where consumers (or consumer organiza-
tions) and sellers argue over approval before it is granted and while the approval request is
being examined. Yet an adversary process might reduce institutional capture that could
result in pro-seller decisions. See Gillette, supra note 15, at 1007-08. This issue is left for fur-
ther development.
163. Interestingly, under this framework, consumers are likely to learn that a mistaken
approval was given only at a relatively late stage, when a dispute arises. At the time of con-
tracting, consumers are likely to refrain from reading the approved SFC, thus not realizing
the acceptance of lopsided yet approved terms.
164. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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Following this logic, consumers, or perhaps consumer organiza-
tions, should be allowed to apply for invalidation of approved
contracts to the approving institution itself.16 By allowing this, we
might be able to overcome some of the impediments that cause
consumers not to launch litigation. It should be possible for the
approving institution to establish a cheap, simple and flexible way
for consumers to complain and deal with approved contract terms.
Making this alternative consumer-friendly and assuring that con-
sumers will not have to face some of the crucial problems that
characterize "regular" litigation will promote enforcement by con-
sumers.6 It will be less formal, less complicated, and less expensive
in comparison to a formal legal process.'67 Moreover, such an ap-
proach would promote unified and efficient decisions. The FCAO
has reviewed the debated contract in the past, it is familiar with its
background, and it will be equipped with the necessary expertise
with which courts are not always equipped.
66
C. Judicial Review: Annulment by Courts
Decisions made by the approval organization affect sellers' and
consumers' legal rights and behavior. Accordingly, the FCAO can
make two main kinds of mistakes. First, it might be mistaken in
granting an approval to a contractual term which does not deserve
one. Up to this point, it is this scenario that has been addressed.
Second, the FCAO could deny approval of contractual provisions
that are efficient and just; provisions that do merit an approval.
Under this second scenario, it is the sellers, not the consumers,
who would have the incentive to challenge the determination.'69 An
effective and intuitive response to both scenarios is to allow judicial
review of the decisions made by the FCAO.
Common law courts have been historically perceived to be the
apt bodies to perform this kind of task. Though definitely not a
flawless institution, judicial review is an important component of
165. A similar approach has been chosen by the Israeli statute, which allows consumer
organizations to apply to the special tribunal for annulment of unfair contract terms. See
supra note 46.
166. Tailoring the exact mechanism that will be available for consumers to confront ap-
proved contracts is a challenge left for future consideration.
167. This is so, since the FCAO is assumed to be more consumer-oriented and less bu-
reaucratic than the courts.
168. Arguably, this might also reduce the social waste resulting from litigation.
169. I here assume that, while the seller will have the ability to challenge the decision
not to approve his contract, he will nevertheless be restricted from suing for damages due to
such a mistake.
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the rule of law. Furthermore, courts are already vested with the re-
sponsibility of shaping contract law and consumer protection
doctrines and policy. It is thus more than reasonable to allow the
judiciary to review the decisions made by the FCAO. Judicial review
will also strengthen the approval organization's image and trust-
worthiness in the eyes of both consumers and sellers. Hence,
courts should be granted the authority to review FCAO decisions,
just as they review other institutions' decisions, actions, and inac-
tions.
VI. FUTURE CHALLENGES AND FURTHER REMARKS
Creating and designing an institution is a complex challenge.
The previous Parts addressed some of the most conspicuous and
important challenges that will arise with respect to the creation of
the FCAO. However, some additional issues are important to ac-
knowledge. This Part points to a few specific matters that should be
kept in mind and explored in the implementation of the FCA solu-
tion.
A. Institutional Identity
Having an organization vested with the authority to approve
SFCs inevitably raises the question of institutional identity. The
analysis above provides some insights into its appropriate charac-
teristics. The main goal in this respect is to ensure that the FCAO
will not suffer from the same problems that afflict legislatures and
judicial bodies. One of the most important concerns, for instance,
is to be sure that this proposed body is designed to have minimum
exposure to rent-seeking interest groups and lobbying, 70 and is
able to approach the issue in a comprehensive manner.
The FCAO should be able to provide strong incentives to sellers
to use the mechanism and should be granted the resources neces-
sary to make it function and enforce its requirements. A central
institution backed by governmental funds seems the preferred type
for this function and its correlative goals. Though establishment of
an administrative body is intuitively appealing, 7 the shortcomings
170. For a detailed discussion of the institutional vulnerability to capture, see Gillette,
supra note 15.
171. Cf Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: Incom-
plete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 83-84 (1999).
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of this approach should not be overlooked.1 2 Hence, there might
be positive attributes to other types of bodies-such as nonprof-
its-as well.
173
The institution's governance structure should have a very open
and adaptable design, but determining the optimal composition is
another challenging task. Clearly, the chosen composition can in-
fluence the institution's ability to fulfill its purpose, but it can also
affect the public's confidence in it 174 and, hence, the success of the
entire initiative. As a starting point, the analysis above suggests that
its members should include those with expertise in law, economics,
psychology, consumer behavior and marketing.
B. Is a New Institution Necessary?
Crafting a new institution is an expensive and complex task.
Therefore, a preliminary issue to be considered is whether an exist-
ing institution is suited to the role of approving SFCs. A cogent
response to this question at this early stage is difficult to provide,
but the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") 75 is one example
worth keeping in mind.'
7 6
172. Gillette, for instance, questions the ability of an administrative body to perform a
thorough analysis of SFCs, which requires it not only to absorb economic studies, but also
"to evaluate the findings of the expert staff and incorporate those findings into decisions
that ultimately generate political implications." Gillette, supra note 15, at 1002.
173. See Kevin Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L.
Rv. 1075, 1101-02 & 1002 nn.82-86 (2006) (suggesting that nonprofit entities can play an
important role in drafting SFCs and recommending a presumption of enforceability for
such privately approved contracts).
174. For example, an institution that is too consumer-oriented will result in sellers' un-
willingness to use the proposed mechanism. On the other hand, an institution that is
strongly influenced by sellers' interests and interest groups will not win consumers' accep-
tance.
175. Established in 1914, the FTC is a well-known independent agency, with the primary
objective of protecting consumers. See Federal Trade Commission, About the Federal Trade
Commission, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited June 13, 2009) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). To fulfill its mission, the FTC's Bureau
of Consumer Protection ("BCP") "conducts investigations, sues companies and people who
violate the law, develops rules to protect consumers, and educates consumers and businesses
about their rights and responsibilities." Eileen Harrington, About the Bureau of Consumer
Protection, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/about.shtm (last visitedJune 13, 2009) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The BCP is in charge, inter alia, of enforc-
ing federal consumer protection laws, which are aimed at preventing undesired behavior
that might harm consumers. The BCP's numerous initiatives and responsibilities include, for
instance, the famous "National Do Not Call Registry" initiative, proposing broad guidelines
governing the sale of used vehicles, and combating manipulative telemarketing practices. See
id.; see also 16 C.F.R. § 455 (2008).
176. Gillette mentions the Consumer Product Safety Commission as another possible
alternative for performing such a task. Gillette, supra note 15, at 983.
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Harnessing the power of an existing agency such as the FTC may
advance the FCA mechanism in various ways; a few prominent ones
are briefly noted here. First, using an institution that currently ex-
ists will reduce establishment costs, since it will utilize already
functioning mechanisms and apparatuses. Second, it will use the
expertise and knowledge already accumulated in this body.1
77
Third, it will take advantage of the reputation from which the FTC
already benefits. Fourth, it will place the initiative of contract ap-
proval in a more general context of consumer protection and
marketplace efficacy. Fifth, from a potential employees' perspec-
tive, working in an established and wide-ranging body may be more
appealing than working in an institution whose function is limited
to approving SFCs. This, in turn, should enhance the prospects of
attracting skilled professionals. All these different aspects should
be taken into account upon the establishment of such a mecha-
nism.
C. Institutional Guidelines, Procedures and Scope of Authority
In light of the analysis suggested here, the FCAO should be
mandated to help reduce market failures and augment economic
efficiency. However, it is possible that there will be contracts that
the FCAO cannot competently analyze or decide whether to ap-
prove. In these cases it might be wise to require the approval
organization to signal to consumers what the uncertain terms are.
This can be done, for example, by demanding that these problem-
atic terms be flagged and specifically consented to.
7 9
Another tricky question concerns the consequences of denying
an approval request. One aspect deals with the terms that are
deemed problematic at the time of inspection. On the one hand, if
we want to protect consumers from unfair terms, maybe contract
terms that were denied approval should be declared void and sell-
ers should be prohibited from using them. On the other hand,
such a result would reduce sellers' willingness to submit their con-
tracts for approval in the first place. Considering that the
approving body is not a judicial entity, since denying an approval
can be based on other considerations than unfairness, and taking
177. For instance, the Frc has already adopted a set of standardized non-salient con-
tract terms in the context of the mail order industry. See Mann, supra note 75, at 916.
178. See supra Part II.A.
179. Some means to achieve this goal have been discussed in Part II.B.
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into account sellers' incentives, declaring non-approved contract
terms void seems too harsh a measure.180
Another important aspect to consider is determining whether
approval requires payment of an approval fee. Requiring payment
as part of an approval procedure makes the "interaction cost" more
expensive,18' thus undermining the sellers' incentive to approve
their contracts. On the other hand, requiring a fee might be neces-
sary for financing the FCAO, especially if it will be held liable for
mistaken approval decisions. A fee might even make contract ap-
proval more valuable by increasing its reputation, since people
tend to appreciate what they pay for more than what they get for
free. In addition, an approval fee imposed on sellers will also help
to ensure serious intentions to use the approved contract in com-
merce. Lastly, it will take advantage of the human tendency to
commit to sunk costs.
Assuming that sellers pay for contractual approval, another re-
lated procedural question is whether there should be different fees
for different kinds of circumstances and approvals and whether
sellers should be required to pay, in part or in full, even in cases
where the application for approval has been denied. I already
noted above the ability to utilize and manipulate the size of the fee
in order to achieve desired consequences. I suggested, for exam-
ple, that a lower premium can be charged where the fact of
approval is noted on the face of the contract.18 2 Likewise, a lower
premium could be charged for SFCs that are approved as a whole
rather than those that are only partially approved.' 83
In addition, we might opt to employ different fees for different
types of transactions and contracts.8 4 Or the fee could take the
form of a kind of insurance premium that is assigned to the ap-
180. One alternative would be to force sellers to specify on their contracts that certain
terms were found problematic by the FCAO. Other alternatives can be to require conspicu-
ous representation of such terms or a separate consent. In addition, we might create a
committee that would negotiate ex ante problematic terms with their drafters. Another op-
tion would be to have a list of terms that were denied approval made open to the public.
According to this option, in case of future litigation or before committing to an important
transaction, consumers will be able to accompany their argument against controversial terms
by referring to this list. If this method is chosen, measures should be taken in order to in-
sure that this list is readily available to the public and easy to search and use.
181. See supra Part IV.B.4.
182. This would make it easier on consumers to shop for approved contracts. See supra
text accompanying note 145.
183. See supra Part II.A.
184. Under this reading, sellers that are denied approval will nevertheless have to pay
for submitting their contracts for an institutional examination by the FCAO.
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proved contract on account of its commercial nature."' Lastly, the
fee can be derived from a combination of factors. According to this
third option, sellers who were denied approval would pay only the
part of the fee that correlates with the institutional cost of inspect-
ing the contract.
An additional important matter is the relationship between the
FCA solution and current legislation and SFC doctrines. After set-
ting up the system, it would still be necessary to deal with standing
legislation aimed to protect consumers who contract via SFCs. It
seems plausible to assume that some statutes and consumer protec-
tion initiatives should be substantially changed under the FCA
solution, while others should be left untouched. Existing contract
doctrines and current regulation will play an important role in de-
veloping the FCA solution, and substantive guidelines should be
advanced gradually.
D. Approval and Its Retrospective and Indirect Consequences
The analysis above focused mainly on prospective consequences
that might arise in light of the fact that an approval is asked for,
given, or denied. Yet, in addition to its future-directed conse-
quences, contract approval has a whole array of retrospective and
indirect implications. These include, for example, the way in which
the contract approval will affect transactions made under an SFC
prior to its approval (assuming the same contract is used in com-
merce before and after being approved), whether an approval can
be used as prima facie evidence of fairness for contracts and con-
tract terms that are similar or identical to ones that have been
approved, whether the fact that a contract or a term (or a similar
one) was denied approval can be used as a prima facie indication
of unfairness, and what meaning, if any, should be attributed to a
seller's decision to change or omit terms before submitting his
contracts for approval (when the changed or omitted terms are
subsequently disputed). None of these issues can be settled at this
early stage, and are thus left for future development.
185. This alternative becomes attractive when we recall our conclusion in Part V that
the approval organization should be able to back its approvals by providing some kind of
insurance for sellers and consumers. If this alternative is chosen, sellers who were denied
approval will be exempted, at least to some degree, from paying the fee.
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VII. ADDRESSING SOME GENERAL OBJECTIONS
This Part tackles three general objections, not yet discussed, re-
garding the creation of the FCAO. Attending to these general
concerns will also provide a rough overview and summary of some
of the most important issues that this Article has confronted.
A. Excessive Costs
The argument of excessive costs maintains that the costs of cre-
ating the FCA mechanism are likely to exceed the benefit gained
through its establishment and operation. While it is safe to assume
that crafting this alternative solution would be costly, I do not think
that those costs would outweigh its benefit. First, it is well-known
that most transactions entered into by individuals, including some
of the most important ones, are executed via SFCs.18 6 The signifi-
cance of the problems associated with SFCs cannot easily be
exaggerated, especially when keeping in mind the more vulnerable
groups of consumers.1 7 Creating a system that will allow traders to
approve their contracts will have an enormous influence on the
SFCs that govern much of our everyday life. Hopefully, it will also
promote trust and confidence between sellers and buyers.
Moreover, the argument of excessive costs inflicted on sellers
fails to acknowledge the fact that this mechanism can benefit trad-
ers as well. As noted, contract approval hopefully can reduce
transaction costs and increase public confidence, as well as reduce
legal fees and expenses paid to lawyers who draft excessively long
SFCs,'98 which virtually no one is able, or has the time or patience,
to read and understand properly. Additionally, it has the potential
186. See, e.g., Donald B. King, Standard Form Contracts: A Cal for Reality, 44 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 909, 912 (2000) ("Therefore, the consumer in most larger purchases-furniture, cars,
televisions, refrigerators, etc.-is faced with a standard form contract." (citing Patterson v.
ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1659, 1664 (Ct. App. 1993))); Meyerson, supra
note 2, at 594; Daniel T. Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic
Visions of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 193, 226-27 (1998); Kaustuv M. Das, Note, Fo-
rum-Selection Clauses in Consumer Clickwrap and Browsewrap Agreements and the "Reasonably
Communicated" Test, 77 WASH. L. REV. 481, 483 (2002).
187. Such groups are susceptible to both ex post and ex ante discrimination. Ex ante, sell-
ers who can distinguish different kinds of consumers might offer poor contracts to
disadvantaged ones. Ex post, sellers might not grant relief to underprivileged consumers,
knowing that the harm such consumers are able to inflict on the firm is rather negligible.
See, e.g., Cruz & Hinck, supra note 6, at 673-75.
188. For an articulation of the general argument that American contracts are long and
the possible reasons for this phenomenon, see Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How do
German Contracts do as Much with Fewer Words?, 79 CHI.-KasrT L. REv. 889 (2004).
[VOL. 42:4
A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism
of significantly reducing the social waste that results from litigating
consumer cases.
Finally, there might be some ways to reduce these costs or han-
dle them cleverly. One such idea is to allow an existing body-such
as the FTC-to perform the FCA function. 9 Allocating a substan-
tial part of punitive damages awards to the FCAO is another
interesting proposed method.' 90 Additional means, such as requir-
ing sellers to pay some kind of fee in order to obtain an approval,' 91
should be examined as the solution develops.
B. Passing the Costs onto Consumers
The second general argument against the approach developed
in this Article is that the FCA solution will induce sellers to offer
better terms, but consumers will be the ones to pay the price for
these improved provisions. Slightly restated, sellers will externalize
the costs associated with the FCA mechanism to the general pool
of consumers by raising products prices. Consumers will end up
paying for upgraded contract terms they do not necessarily value.
I do not find this to be a persuasive argument. First, while it is
true that sellers might bear some costs, this argument, like the pre-
vious one, ignores the fact that the FCA approach would likely
reduce some expenses and increase profits as well.' 92 Second, even if
sellers do not offset their expenses with the benefit they derive
from the proposed FCA mechanism, it is not obvious that they will
be able to pass the costs fully onto consumers. In some markets
sellers may bear at least some of the costs generated by the new
regime. Third, even if consumers end up paying higher prices for
better terms, the FCA proposal will help them to avoid contract
provisions they do not know how to evaluate accurately.'93 This
promotes consumers' ability to shop efficiently and better respects
their autonomy. Additionally, assuming that the harm caused by
unfair SFC terms is frequently underestimated, consumers might
be better off letting an independent, professional and objective
entity evaluate contract provisions, even if prices ultimately rise as a
result. Last but not least, it is important to keep in mind that the
189. See supra Part VI.B.
190. See supra Part IV.B.3.
191. See supra Part VI.C.
192. See supra Part IV.B.4.
193. Moreover, one might argue that if consumers are willing to pay this allegedly
higher price, this can be viewed as a signal that they get and pay for what they want and
prefer.
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mechanism proposed here is basically voluntary. Consumers will
still have the possibility of entering unapproved contracts and
avoiding those alleged additional costs.
C. Contract Shopping Will Eventually Be Eliminated
The third general allegation against the FCA solution is that it
will create a new equilibrium where all sellers offer the same set of
approved terms. Therefore, the argument goes, consumers will
lose their ability to shop for different contract terms. It might as
well be argued that, under this proposed system (which promotes
less heterogeneity in contractual terms), sellers will be able to col-
lude much more easily and price fixing will become more
common.9 4 Maintaining consumers' ability to shop for different
contracts and contract terms, according to this argument, is an im-
portant value which ought to be protected as it assures consumers'
ability to face different kinds and levels of risks, represented by dif-
ferent contract terms and prices.
Though appealing, this argument is wrong for at least four rea-
sons. First, it presupposes that currently consumers can (and do)
shop for different contracts that the market is presumed to offer.
This argument is frequently fallacious--either because of uniform-
ity of contractual terms in some fields of commerce 195 or because of
extreme contractual complexity that accompany others.' 96 Second,
even if contract shopping occurs, if one option is maintaining the
ability to shop between fair and unfair contracts, whereas the other
option is eliminating contract shopping by creating only fair con-
194. For an in-depth analysis of the relation between SFCs, transaction costs and collu-
sion over price and contractual terms, see David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of
Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of
Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REv. 983 (2006).
195. See Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The Effect
of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REv. 391, 430-31 (1990). Areas that seem to suffer
from this type of problem are, inter alia, SFCs for car rentals, bank accounts, airline tickets,
and the like. For recent studies that examine whether consumers read SFCs, see Yannis
Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? A Test
of the Informed Minority Hypothesis Using Clickstream Data (work in progress, on file with au-
thor); Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, Myth and Reality in Consumer Contracting
Behavior (Mar. 1, 2009) (working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id= 117422.
196. This may be the case, for instance, in the credit card industry. See Mann, supra note
75, at 927-29 (discussing standardization of contract terms and contracts in the credit card
industry and proposing that pre-approved terms will enhance competition over price-related
provisions which consumers are better able to understand). Mann further opines that stan-
dardizations of terms might, in the long run, increase consumers' ability to comprehend
their agreements and assess them correctly. Id. at 929.
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tracts, then there is no true value in the first alternative. Third,
the argument ignores the simple fact that in many contexts there
might be more than one set of fair and efficient terms. 98 Whereas
sellers who wish to gain contract approval will be excluded from
using some terms (which are deemed unfair), sellers will be none-
theless free to choose among those terms that are perceived to be
fair and efficient. As noted, different terms might be deemed effi-
cient for different kinds or groups of consumers.'9 Hence,
consumers will still have the ability to shop for contracts that match
their true preferences. Fourth, since the proposal here is to create
a voluntary system, in most fields of commerce consumers will still
have the ability to choose between approved and unapproved
terms. 200 The more accurate argument, therefore, is that contract
versatility might be reduced and restricted, rather than eliminated.
However, this will mainly benefit consumers as a class.
CONCLUSION
Many commentators acknowledge the signing-without-reading
problem and the behavioral biases that come into play when deal-
ing with consumer contracts. The phenomenon of SFCs has been
analyzed through numerous prisms, most notably those based on
economics, psychology, and consumer-protection (fairness or dis-
tributive) standpoints. 20 1 All of this invaluable scholarly work
suggests important insights into the way the law should understand
and treat SFCs. Still, the leading approaches that have been pro-
posed and advanced thus far do not amount to a suitable
framework that can accommodate conventional contract law. The
inevitable result is that consumers are left with inadequate protec-
tion, so that social welfare and efficiency are undercut.
Accordingly, this Article proposes and develops an alternative
approach, based on a voluntarily pre-approval system for consumer
197. See id. at 927 (referring to Arthur Leff's views and explaining that "consumers are
better off with the higher price (or lower quantity or quality) of the product that comes in a
market without the choice to accept the prohibited term.").
198. This argument responds to the fear of seller's plotting and price fixing as well.
199. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
200. There are some fields of commerce which are dominated by sophisticated con-
sumers who might not value third-party approval that much. In addition, if approved
contracts do indeed end up being more expensive, some consumers might opt to save this
additional premium and face unapproved terms, relying on legal system relief, their experi-
ence, expertise, and assertiveness, or simply trusting to luck.
201. A recent illustration of this statement is the articles that are part of the Symposium
on "Boilerplate": Foundations of Market Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REv. 821 (2006).
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SFCs. As detailed throughout, the overall outlook of this alternative
solution is promising. First, it will considerably negate the main
market failure that SFCs create, namely obligational asymmetric
202information. Besides having the potential of being more
effective, this alternative approach has merits that current methods
lack: it will increase social welfare by reducing transaction costs,
2 0 3
diminish socially undesirable litigation over standardized con-
tracts, 2°4 and advance trust among buyers and sellers, thus
promoting market participants' autonomy. Moreover, the FCA ap-
proach takes a notable step toward minimizing the alleged
anomaly that punitive damage awards create in consumer contract205
cases. 2 Additionally, it better reconciles the tension between the
general duty to read and the common practice of signing without
reading. Lastly, the alternative established here is much more
sensitive to consumers' bounded rationality since it takes these as-
pects into consideration in many different aspects.2
°7
Developing a mechanism of prior third-party approval, tailored
to the context of consumer contracts, is a neat tactic. The need for
a novel solution that can be implemented while promoting con-
cepts of both fairness and efficiency is manifest. A large body of
literature suggests that a fresh approach to SFCs is indispensable.
Knowing that the "devil is in the details," this Article undertook the
task of developing an alternative approach to consumer contracts.
There is yet much more work to be done and many more hurdles
to overcome, but the long-lasting puzzle of consumer standard
form contracts can be differently and wisely resolved.
202. See supra Parts II, III.
203. See supra Part IV.
204. Id.
205. See supra Part IV.B.3.
206. See supra Part III.
207. For a few examples noted throughout this paper, see supra Part II.C (opting for a
binary approval regime due to consumers' cognitive limitations); Part III (proposing not to
impose a duty to read approved contracts due to consumers' bounded rationality); Part
IV.D. (acknowledging cognitive biases which mightjustify mandatory approval in some fields
of commerce); Part VI.A (proposing to include psychologists and behavioral economics
experts in the FCAO composition); text accompanying notes 83-85 (opining that the idea
of consumers delegating their role in contract formation to the FCAO might be a superior
approach since consumers are not always competent to evaluate standardized terms cor-
rectly).
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